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This paper documents the existence of a negative cross-sectional correlation between the 
price of living space and fertility using U.S. Census data over the period 1940-2000.  This 
correlation is not spurious, nor does it reflect the tendency of larger families to locate within less-
expensive areas of a given metropolitan area.  We examine the extent to which the results reflect 
the sorting of married couples across metropolitan areas on desired fertility.  The relationship 
between the unit price of living space and fertility in fact tends to be more negative for 
households that have moved recently.  However, the probability of migration between 
metropolitan areas is smaller for larger families, even those originating in more expensive cities.  
Moreover, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests reveal only limited evidence of endogeneity.  The weaker 
effects of the price of living space for less mobile couples seems to be at least in part a result of 
their choosing to live in less-expensive portions within a given metropolitan area.          
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“Increased splendor, with higher prices for the necessaries of life, keep 
men from marrying in the cities.”  Johann Suessmilch, 1760 (in Adna F. Weber, 
1899, p. 330).  
1. Introduction 
A good deal of research has examined the emergence of low fertility rates in Europe.  
Kohler et. al. (2002) investigates the emergence of what they call “lowest-low fertility” in 
Europe.  Among other factors, they noted that the availability of housing was of particular 
concern, especially in Italy and Spain.  Recent research by Giannelli and Monfardini (2003) 
found that the price of housing had an effect on household membership among Italian youths.  
The importance of housing in the family economic decisions is not limited to Europe.  
Recently, Egan (2005) wrote in the New York Times that  
“Portland is one of the nation's top draws for the kind of educated, self-starting 
urbanites that midsize cities are competing to attract. But … [o]fficials say that the very 
things that attract people who revitalize a city - dense vertical housing, fashionable 
restaurants and shops and mass transit that makes a car unnecessary - are driving out 
children by making the neighborhoods too expensive for young families.”   
 
To take another example, San Francisco is legendary for the small fraction of children in its 
population, due at least in part to its high cost of housing, with a median price of about $700 
thousand (Gonazales 2005).   
This paper examines the relationship between fertility and the price of living space across 
metropolitan areas.  A growing literature, much of it focused on developing countries, has found 
just such a relationship.  Although researchers have used U.S. data to examine the relationship 
between the price of living space and living arrangements (Hughes 2003; Borsch-Supan 1986; 
Haurin et. al. 1993), there is, to our knowledge no work on fertility per se.   
This paper examines the relationship between fertility and the scarcity of living space 
across U.S. metropolitan areas over the period 1940-2000 using data from the Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) and the 1985-96 American Housing Surveys (AHS).  To  
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foreshadow our findings, we document a statistically significant negative cross-sectional 
relationship between the price of living space and fertility.  This relationship does not arise as an 
artifact of our measure of the price of living space – rent per room – or merely due to the effects 
of timing.   
We recognize that fertility choice and geographic location are potentially simultaneous, 
with couples who desire larger families being able to move to less expensive neighborhoods 
within a metropolitan area, or, indeed, to less expensive metropolitan areas.  We try to reduce the 
potential for simultaneity of fertility and within-metro location choice by measuring the scarcity 
of living space at the level of the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), the most 
inclusive metropolitan unit of observation available.  We also examine the potential for 
simultaneity between fertility choice and choice of CMSA, both by exploiting information in the 
IPUMS on mobility 5 years prior to the Census, as well as by testing for endogeneity of the price 
of living space in our fertility models.  In practice, there was modest evidence of endogeneity bias 
for the 1960 and 1970 Census years, but not for the other years.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 motivates the paper with some cross-
country data and briefly reviews the literature.  Section 3 outlines a simple model.
2  Section 4 is 
devoted to a discussion of the various sources of data and Section 5 to our empirical strategy.  An 
overview of the data is provided in Section 6.  Section 7 focuses on the demand for living space.  
The basic fertility results are presented in Section 8.  Section 9 investigates whether the estimates 
in Section 8 might be explained by timing effects (delayed marriage and fertility).  Section 10 
examines the potential role of selective migration.  Section 11 presents additional endogeneity 
diagnostics and IV estimates.  Section 12 concludes with some implications of our findings and 
suggestions for future research.   
                                                      
2 Our (2007) working paper presents a formal model.    
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2. Motivation and Literature 
To our knowledge our paper is the first to examine the relationship between fertility and 
the scarcity of living space using U.S. Census micro data.  However, our paper is related to work 
in a number of areas.  A good deal of work has analyzed the link between the scarcity of land and 
fertility in rural populations, as well as the impact of urbanization on fertility.  Relatively few 
studies focus on the relationship between the scarcity of living space and fertility in an urban 
setting, and those that we have found are relatively early and use data on single cities.
3     
Economists have long theorized that the demand for children is inversely related to the 
availability of land.  Alfred Marshall (1920), for example, professed that there existed “no 
conditions more favourable to the rapid growth of numbers than those of the agricultural districts 
of new countries,” where, in addition to other advantages, “land is to be had in abundance” (p. 
152).  By contrast, urbanization should temper fertility, for in the towns “the gradual rise in the 
value of land” would tend to “check the increase of population.”
4  Early empirical studies of the 
question include F.S. Crum (1897) and Adna F. Weber (1899).  More recently, Lindert (1978) 
hypothesized that “an extra urban child, relative to the urban alternatives to that child, is 
definitely more expensive in the city, where (a) real wages are higher, (b) food is more expensive 
relative to luxuries, and (c) land-intensive, child-oriented living space is more expensive” (p. 
133).”   
Lindert (1978) and Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) were skeptical that higher rents would 
discourage fertility because parents of larger families can substitute towards lower-quality 
                                                      
3 Kitagawa and Hauser (1967) studied the city of Chicago. Heeren and Moors (1969) found housing 
pressures to be an important determinant of desired fertility in their study of young couples in Utrecht, The 
Netherlands.  Felsen and Solaún (1975), using data from a “natural” experiment in Bogota, Columbia, 
found that couples living in apartments were less likely to have children than couples living in houses.  
4 Marshall was referring to “districts in which the system of peasant properties prevails, in which there is 
not much enterprise for opening out new trades or for emigration, and parents feel that the social position of 




5  Rather, they have emphasized the role of tastes, particularly when it comes to 
explaining the urban-rural fertility differential.
6  Although our study is focused on fertility 
differentials across urban areas and not on the urban-rural fertility differential, variations in tastes 
may still be important.   
Our paper is closely related to a number of studies of living arrangements using data on 
U.S. metropolitan areas.  For example, Borsch-Supan (1986) used data on three metropolitan 
areas from the 1976-77 Annual Housing Surveys to show that household formation was strongly 
negatively related to housing prices.  Similar conclusions were reached by Haurin et. al. (1993), 
who examined data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and by Ermisch (1999), 
who examined data from the British Household Panel Survey.  Gianelli and Monfardini (2003) 
examined data on household formation among Italian youths, and found, too, that the price of 
housing was an important determinant.   
Perhaps closest in spirit and to our methodology is Hughes (2003), who used 1990 PUMS 
data to analyze the impact of rents on domestic living arrangements at the Metropolitan Area 
level.  She categorized households as either married, cohabiting, living alone, living with 
roommates, or living with parents, and measured the unit price of housing as the average rent, 
including utilities, of a one-bedroom, three-room apartment within each Metropolitan Area, 
derived from the housing information on Census records.  Multinomial logistic regressions 
revealed that higher housing costs were associated with greater likelihoods of living alone, with 
roommates, or with parents compared to being married.     
We believe that Kohler et. al. (2002) are the first to suggest that the scarcity of living 
space might account for falling fertility in Europe.  Unfortunately, systematic data on the price of 
living space in Europe do not appear to be publicly available.   Indeed, this is one reason why our 
                                                      
5 “Extra children presumably raise the demand for rooms, floor space, and lot acreage…” (p. 125).     
However, because housing is not homogeneous, a rise in house rents in general need not raise the relative 
cost of a child, since extra children “reduce the demand for housing value per room or per acre” (p. 125). 
6According to Lindert (1978), it is necessary “to explain why their tastes (or personal productivities) are 
more biased toward high-input children” (p. 133).  See, too, Easterlin and Crimmins (1985, esp. p. 23).  
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paper focuses on the U.S. experience.  However, to explore in a preliminary way the relationship 
between fertility and the scarcity of living space, we collected data on fertility and urban 
population density – intended as a proxy for the scarcity of living space -- for European countries, 
Canada, and the United States.
7  These data are graphed in Figure 1.  As can be seen, there is a 
strong negative correlation between fertility and population density across European and North 
American countries.  Needless to say, these data are only suggestive.  They do, however, suggest 
that further investigation might be warranted.   
3. Equilibrium Fertility Differentials 
Sato (2006) develops a formal model of equilibrium fertility differentials in which larger 
city sizes give rise to agglomeration economies, which in turn generate positive income effects 
and negative substitution effects on fertility. Sato’s (2006) model does not include land prices 
explicitly.  Rather, larger city size is accompanied by greater congestion, which reduces the 
demand for children.  In equilibrium, larger cities experience net in-migration, have higher 
wages, higher land prices, and lower fertility. 
8  Of course, differences in the price of living space 
can arise for reasons other than congestion, such as restrictive zoning and other land use 
regulations, as in Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005), as well as consumption amenities and 
economies of agglomeration in production (Roback 1982).    
The higher wages in larger, more expensive cities could induce women to substitute away 
from household activities and toward market work, and possibly away from child quantity and 
toward child quality as in Sato (2004).  Alternatively, larger cities may offer better labor market 
opportunities, and hence be particularly attractive to women who are more career oriented, and 
who have lower demands for children.  The empirical work below attempts to control for this 
source of potential bias.   
                                                      
7 The fertility data were taken from the CIA Factbook (2004) and the data on population density were 
computed from data taken from the Demographia website.  The population density data originated as city-
level densities.  The population densities were then averaged by country (weighted by city populations).   




4.1. IPUMS Census Data 
We constructed a comprehensive sample of married, spouse-present U.S. metropolitan 
households using data from the 1940-2000 Integrated Public Use Microdata Surveys (IPUMS).  
IPUMS data contain two measures of fertility.  The first measure, available for all years, is the 
number of children currently living in the household (NCHILD).  The second, available only 
through 1990, is children ever born (CHBORN).
9   We therefore concentrate on number of 
children currently in the household, focusing in particular on younger couples (wives) in order to 
reduce the possibility that children have moved out of the household.  Our results do, however, 
generally extend to older households, for whom we present a limited subset of findings.   
A number of factors limited our analysis.  The 1940 and 1950 censuses identify a 
relatively small number of metropolitan areas and collected detailed information for only a subset 
of households called “sample line records,” thus limiting the number of cells and sample size in 
those years.  The 1950 Census collected data on only one sample-line person per household, so 
that detailed information on the husband is not available.  The finest level of geographic detail for 
the 1960 Census year is the state.  Rather than drop 1960 entirely, we measure rent per room and 
the other aggregate variables at the state level.  We used data only on urban households from the 
1960 IPUMS, and the Metro samples from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 IPUMS.  The 1970 sample 
(also known as County Group sample) only identifies areas of 250,000 or more, and the 1980 
census only identified migration status for 50 percent of the households.  We used the unweighted 
sample for 2000, which identifies a larger number of CMSAs than the weighted sample.   
4.2. Measuring the Scarcity of Living Space 
The IPUMS Census data contain information on the scarcity of living space in the form 
of measures of rent or, for owners, the value of the dwelling.  However, variation across 
                                                      
9 We excluded households reporting more than 15 births.  
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households in rent or house value reflects at least in part variation across locations within a 
metropolitan area (e.g., central city versus outer suburbs).  If, for example, larger families tend to 
locate in less expensive areas within a city, estimates of the effect of the scarcity of living space 
on fertility, if not corrected for simultaneity bias, will be overstated.   
We therefore define the price of living space over a region sufficiently large that it does 
not reflect location decisions within a city (e.g., between central city and suburb): the 
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), or 
New England County Metropolitan Area (NECMA), whichever was largest, according to Census 
2000 definitions.  For simplicity, we refer to our geographic unit of analysis as the CMSA.
  10
  
Variables measured at the CMSA level, by construction, should not be affected by the residential 
(self-) selection of households between neighborhoods or cities within a CMSA.
11 
Our primary measure of the scarcity of living space is CMSA RENT/ROOM, which is 
calculated as median (gross) rent in the CMSA divided by either the median or average number of 
rooms.  This variable is a population-weighted average of the original county-level data.   
Although CMSA RENT/ROOM reflects average prices of only renters, it is highly correlated in 
the cross section with (owners’) housing value per room, and has the advantage of being less 
contaminated by errors in judgment on the part of Census households regarding the value of their 
homes (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005, p. 370).
12  
                                                      
10To be precise, the aggregate unit of analysis is the set of counties that comprise the CMSA as of 2000.  
The resulting metropolitan areas are quite inclusive.  For example, the New York City CMSA includes 
Nassau and Suffolk counties in New York, Bergen-Passaic, Middlesex and Somerset counties in New 
Jersey.  New England NECMAs are similarly inclusive: the Boston CMSA includes the cities of Worcestor, 
Lawrence, Haverhill, Lowell, and Salem-Gloucestor counties, and includes regions in New Hampshire, 
Maine, and Connecticut. 
11 It is common to reduce simultaneity bias by using a less fine level of aggregation for the explanatory 
variable than for the dependent variable (e.g., Guryan, 2004).  For example, in their study of urban social 
interaction, Brueckner and Largey (2007) used metropolitan-wide population density as an instrument for 
census-tract density.  The key identifying assumption is that although “people may self-select across tracts 
in endogenous fashion, choice of a metro area (and hence a level of aggregate density) is unrelated to 
unobservable characteristics affecting social interaction.”  The same logic underlies our use of CMSA-wide 
rents to measure the price of living space.   
12 We also constructed a price variable using information from the Census household record, OWN 
RENT/ROOM, equal to monthly contract rent divided by the number of rooms in the dwelling (or, for  
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4.3. An Alternative Price Measure from American Housing Survey Data   
If larger families tend to live in houses with square footage similar to that of smaller 
houses occupied by smaller families, but more rooms, a spurious negative correlation between 
fertility and real rent per room might arise.  Unfortunately, IPUMS data do not report the square 
footage of the dwelling.
13  Although we cannot circumvent the problem entirely, we used data 
from the metropolitan samples of the 1988-93 American Housing Surveys (AHS), available for 
44 SMSAs on a rotating basis (see Appendix A), to construct two measures of housing cost per 
square foot, which we were able to match up to 36 CMSAs in our IPUMS samples.  The first 
measure is mean housing cost per square foot (ZSMHC/UNITSF).
14  Monthly housing cost 
includes basic utilities and insurance payments in addition to rent or mortgage payment.  The 
second is CMSA RENT/FT
2, which was constructed by dividing CMSA RENT/ROOM by mean 
square foot per room as computed from the American Housing Survey.  In addition to using these 
variables to estimate fertility regressions using IPUMS data, we also estimated fertility 
regressions using data from the pooled American Housing Surveys.  Although statistical 
significance is often modest in light of the limited number of CMSAs, the results suggest that the 
relationships we estimate using CMSA RENT/ROOM are not merely spurious.  
5. Empirical Strategy   
5.1. Specification 
Our goal is to obtain, in the words of Hotz et. al. (1997), “unbiased (or consistent) 
estimates of the ‘reduced-form’ effects of ‘exogenous’ changes in various prices which are 
related to children and their production and in household income on the number of children 
                                                                                                                                                              
owners, imputed based on the value of their dwelling).  The results were similar to those obtained using 
CMSA-level information, but introduced the problem of correcting for dwelling characteristics and 
exacerbated the issue of simultaneity.  
13 We are not the first researchers to face this difficulty.  See, for example, Margo 1996.   
14Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), we tried imputing square footage by regressing square footage on 
a host of housing characteristics common to both AHS and IPUMS.  The imputations were too noisy to be 
useful, the R-Squares ranging between 0.35 and 0.40, and the errors in measurement driving the estimated 
coefficients on the price variable toward zero.    
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demanded (and borne) by parents over their lifetimes” (p. 322).
15  We use a reduced form because 
our purpose is not to estimate the income and substitution effects of husband’s and wife’s wages, 
but rather to control for their determinants.
16   
The use of a reduced form potentially introduces timing bias: that is, couples in more 
densely populated CMSAs could simply delay fertility until later in life.  We assess the 
importance of timing in a number of ways.  First, we estimate the effects of the scarcity of living 
space on age at first marriage and age at first birth.  If the estimated effects are relatively small, 
one can be more confident that the estimated effects of the scarcity of living space on fertility do 
not merely reflect delay.  Also, as noted earlier, we have information on cumulative lifetime 
fertility for older households (in which the wife is 41 years of age or older and for whom fertility 
is presumably complete) for the years 1940 through 1990.   
5.2. Simultaneity Bias 
Hotz et. al. (1997, pp. 325ff) pointed out that exploiting data from multiple markets to 
identify the effects of various components of price on the demand for children can result in 
simultaneity bias.
17  In addition, many variables that typically enter the demand function – for 
example, wage rates and income – are endogenous.
18  T. Paul Schultz (1997) suggested that the 
researcher specify a parsimonious set of variables in order to avoid simultaneity bias (p. 384).   
                                                      
15Authors who use the reduced form approach include Naz et. al. (2002).  
16Structural estimation would introduce numerous complications, including how to interpret cross-sectional 
results in a life-cycle context.  As is the case with labor supply, current-period choices are a function of all 
current and future prices.  Regressions of current-period fertility on current-period wage rates are 
misspecified and hence lack economic meaning (Hotz et. al. 1997, p. 335).  Structural estimation also 
requires accounting for the simultaneity between fertility and wages (T. Paul Schultz 1997, especially pp. 
367 and 380), particularly if market participation affects human capital accumulation (Hotz et. al. p. 324). 
17 Hotz et. al. (1997) considered the problem of estimating the effect of child care costs on fertility.  If such 
services are not perfectly elastically supplied, regions with high tastes for children will have higher fertility, 
lower rates of female labor force participation, and higher prices for female labor, thus raising the cost of 
child care services.  Not all sources of bias operate in our favor.  For example, regions with higher fertility 
demand could have higher demands for living space and hence higher rents, thus inducing a positive 
correlation between fertility and the unit price of space. 
18Some have suggested correcting our price variable for “affordability” by dividing it by some measure of 
household income.  The simultaneity between fertility and income, however, complicates matters.  At any 
rate, our regressions control for the “exogenous” determinants of income.    
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Such parsimony, although desirable on econometric grounds, runs other risks.  Couples 
may sort on unobserved demands for child quantity and quality.  For example, Hotz et. al. (1997) 
suggested that better – read, more expensive -- neighborhoods might reduce the shadow price of 
child quality, the effect of which would be to increase the shadow price of child quantity, thus 
reducing fertility.  Alternatively, more expensive, more densely populated regions may offer 
amenities that substitute for child quantity, and hence may attract couples with tastes for fewer, 
higher-quality offspring.  
By construction, CMSA RENT/ROOM is uncorrelated with factors that generate sorting 
within a given CMSA.  However, households might also sort across CMSAs on unobservables 
that are correlated both with fertility and the price of living space.  We have tried to address the 
problem in two ways: (1) control variables; (2) accounting for selective migration.   
We take as exogenous variables such as education and age of the husband and wife, race, 
and residence in each of the nine Census regions.  We add to these variables others to control for 
the most likely sources of sorting in the fertility equations.  Although these controls are likely to 
be endogenous, most of them should work against finding an effect of the price of living space on 
fertility.   
We controlled for sorting on climate using 3 variables: heating degree days, cooling 
degree days, and average precipitation.
   To capture (sorting on the) underlying variation in 
demand for child (school) quality, all regressions control for the percentage of individuals in the 
CMSA with a college degree or better.
19  To control for sorting on income, all regressions control 
for log median family income in the CMSA.  We controlled for the demand for urban amenities, 
we included a dummy variable for residence inside a central city.
20  Finally, because more 
                                                      
19 Haurin and Brasington (1996), among others, find school quality to be an important determinant of 
property values. We tried including state-level measures of school quality, which entered inconsistently and 
with little consequence, and hence were not included here to reduce clutter. 
20We also tried Richard Florida’s (2002) Bohemian Index, a measure of the presence of so-called “creative 
capital” in the city.  The variable was available for most, but not all of the cities in the IPUMS samples, and 
entered with mixed sign and significance.  We therefore dropped the variable from our analysis.    
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densely populated, more expensive cities appear to offer better labor market opportunities for 
working women, particularly highly educated women (see Costa and Kahn, 2000), all regressions 
control for wives’ individual labor force participation at the time of the survey and, to capture 
lifetime labor force attachment, the female labor force participation rate in the CMSA.
21   
Selective Migration.  Couples who have moved recently may be more likely to have 
strong preferences for or against children.
22  We assessed the importance of selective migration in 
a number of ways.  First, we estimated the fertility equations separately for movers and stayers.  
Such an exercise is not definitive to the extent that parents have already self-selected across cities.  
Secondly, the IPUMS data contain information on geographic location 5 years prior to the 
Census.  We examined whether larger families were more likely to move out of expensive cities, 
and whether having a large family was associated with movers choosing less expensive cities.  
We also estimated fertility regressions for movers as a function of the price of living space in 
their prior CMSA.  If parents can forecast mobility as well as fertility, there is less reason to 
expect current fertility to be related to rents in the prior CMSA.   
Instrumental Variables Estimation.  We tested for the endogeneity of the price of living 
space using two basic classes of instruments: (1) variables measured at the state level in the 
current state of residence and (2) variables measured at the state level in the state of birth.  The 
instruments included variables measuring educational attainment, climate, family income, female 
labor force participation, as well as state-level measures of rent per room (except for 1960, which 
                                                      
21Another way to control for unobserved heterogeneity is to pool the data and include CMSA-level fixed 
effects.  Fixed-effects estimates of the effect of the price of living space on fertility were of mixed sign and 
significance, depending on the period studied.  Fixed effects estimates, which use solely within-CMSA 
variation in rent and fertility (and the other variables) may be contaminated by the fact that increases in 
rents imply increases in housing prices, which is a source of wealth.  We leave this problem for future 
research.   
22Suppose, for example, that the indirect utility of couple i in current region c is  ic ic ic ii c i Uw r u αβ =+ + , 
where ric is the unit price of living space in city c and βi is more negative for households that have greater 
preferences for children.  A couple will move from c to a less expensive city c’ provided that 
'' ' () ) ) (( ic ic ic ic ic ic ii uu w rC wr αβ −−≤ −+ −− , where C is the fixed cost of moving.  Couples with more 
negative values of βi are more likely to move, other things the same.   
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data are already at the state level) and population density.  The instruments also included CMSA-
level measures of construction costs from R.S. Means (2005).  As will be seen in Section 10, 
there was only modest evidence of endogeneity bias, and that, in these cases, IV estimates of the 
effects of the price of living space on fertility were usually statistically significant.   
6. Data Overview 
6.1. Fertility Differentials 
Table 1 shows the mean number of children in the household for younger (wife age 40 or 
less), married, spouse-present households in the 40 largest CMSAs for the year 2000, sorted from 
low to high fertility.  The table also shows CMSA RENT/ROOM for the same year.  The lowest 
fertility of 1.32 is in the Raleigh-Durham MSA, and two other college towns – Greensboro-
Winston-Salem and Austin-San Marcos – are among the bottom 4.  San Francisco, with a fertility 
of 1.47, rounds out the bottom 5.  The high end is dominated by cities with large concentrations 
of Hispanic households, including Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County CA, Phoenix-Mesa 
AZ, Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, and San Antonio TX, but also includes Salt Lake City-Ogden 
UT.  Although there is no clear relationship between mean children in the household and CMSA 
RENT/ROOM evident in these 40 cities, a simple bivariate plot of the relationship for the 237 
CMSAs in the sample as a whole for that year reveals a negative relationship, seen in Figure 2.
23   
6.2. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for younger couples in the IPUMS samples appear in Part A of Table 
2.  Number of children in the household rises from 1.45 children per young household in 1940 
and 1.47 in 1950 to 2.03 in 1970, but falls to 1.62 in 1980 and 1.55 in 1990, rising slightly to 1.61 
in the year 2000.  As might be expected, average education levels rise over time.  The proportion 
of black households rose from 7.4 percent in 1940 to 9.9 percent in 1970, but fell to 8.2 percent in 
                                                      
23 The equation of the implied regression line is 1.71 – 0.00066 CMSA RENT/ROOM, with a standard 
error on the slope coefficient of 0.00037 and t-statistic of -1.77, which is significant at the 7.8% level.  The 
robust t-statistic is slightly higher, at 2.25, which is significant at the 2.5% level.    
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1980 and 7.6 percent in 1990, rising slightly to 7.8 percent in 2000.  The proportion of Hispanic 
households rose gradually over the period from 2.0 percent in 1940 to 17.5 percent in 2000.  The 
geographic shift of the population to the South and West are evident in the regional dummies.     
Part B of Table 2 contains CMSA-level summary statistics.
24  We have deflated CMSA 
RENT/ROOM by a price index described in Appendix B.  Percent college graduates is equal to 
the number of individuals age 25 and over with a college degree or better.  Percent Catholic is 
defined as total Catholic adherents or members (whichever was available) divided by population; 
1990 data were used for the year 2000, for which information on religious affiliation was 
unavailable. Real family income was defined as nominal family income divided by the CPI; 1950 
income data were used for 1940, which explains the apparent drop between those two decades.  
Female labor force participation rose gradually from about 25 percent in 1940 to nearly 58 
percent in the year 2000.  
7. Evidence on the Demand for Living Space 
A higher price of living space would be expected to affect fertility primarily through the 
demand for living space, which is presumably higher for couples with more children.  We 
estimated equations for the demand for living space using data from both the IPUMS and the 
AHS.  Living space is measured as the number of rooms (ROOMS) in the dwelling in the IPUMS, 
available starting with the year 1970, and as square footage (UNITSF) in the AHS.  The evidence 
from AHS is particularly important because it is possible, at least in theory, that families with 
more children could choose to live in houses of the same square footage – and hence the same 
cost – as families with fewer children, but with more rooms, thus generating a potentially 
spurious negative correlation between fertility and rent per room.         
We restricted the analysis to single-family households, with or without children, but the 
empirical estimates are robust to including other types of households.  Although fertility is clearly 
                                                      
24We filled in missing county-level data on religious affiliation using CMSA-level averages.    
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endogenous, for the purposes of this descriptive exercise, we treat the number of children 
currently in the household as exogenous.
25  We included as control variables the unit price of 
living space, husband’s and wife’s age and education, wife’s race, central city residence, and 
CMSA-level percent college grads, percent Catholic, and log family income.   
The empirical findings are reported in Table 3.  All standard errors are clustered on the 
CMSA.  The estimates from IPUMS data, shown in columns (1)-(4), indicate that each additional 
child in the household is associated with about 0.3 additional rooms in the dwelling.  The other 
variables enter as might be expected.  For example, the number of rooms is negatively associated 
with the price of living space, is higher among older and better-educated couples, and is lower 
among couples who live in central cities.  Even more importantly, the estimates from the AHS 
data, shown in column (5), indicate that dwelling space increases by about 75 square feet per 
child.  This last finding means that a negative correlation between fertility and CMSA 
RENT/ROOM is unlikely to arise simply because larger families tend to occupy houses with 
smaller rooms but similar square footage (and hence similar housing expenditures).    
8. Fertility Regressions 
8.1. Basic Results 
We specified the fertility of individual i in city c, fic, as a linear function of xi, a vector of 
individual-level demographic and economic characteristics, and zc, a vector of city-level 
characteristics:  
  '' ic i c ic fx z β γε = ++ .   (7) 
where  ic ε is an error term.
26   
                                                      
25We are aware of the incongruity of treating fertility as exogenous.  However, 2SLS estimation often 
resulted in implausibly large estimated effects of fertility on the demand for living space.   
26OLS estimates were very close Poisson estimates.  We also tried negative binomial, zero-inflated Poisson, 
and zero-inflated negative binomial specifications.   The negative binomial distribution allows the mean to 
exceed the variance, but some researchers (Santos Silva and Covas, 2000, pp. 173-74) argue that fertility 
data are characterized by under-dispersion.  Other researchers use hurdle models to distinguish between the  
 
15
Table 4 contains OLS estimates of fertility, weighted by person weight (sample line 
weight in 1940 and 1950).  Standard errors are clustered on CMSA throughout.  Before turning to 
the coefficients of primary interest, it is useful to examine the effects of demographic 
characteristics.  Fertility is increasing in wife’s and husband’s age, entered in the form of 
categorical dummy variables; the omitted category is 26 to 30-year olds.  The estimated effects of 
wife’s and husband’s education were negative.  Black households had lower fertility in 1940, but 
higher fertility thereafter.  Hispanic households had higher fertility throughout, but the estimated 
coefficients display an interesting pattern, declining from about 0.5 for the years 1940-1960 to 
about 0.3 for 1970-1980, to 0.23 for 1990- 2000.  Households with a foreign-born husband or 
wife were estimated to have slightly higher fertility in 1940, but lower fertility thereafter.   
Women who were participating in the labor market at the time of the survey tended to have fewer 
children, but the effect of participation declined from about -0.8 for 1940-1960 to -0.4 in 2000.   
Couples living in central cities had fewer children, with an estimated effect of about -0.2 
from 1940 through 1960, and about -0.1 from 1980 onward.  The estimated effects of CMSA 
percent college graduates varied in sign and significance, while the estimated coefficients on 
CMSA log family income entered, with the exception of 1950 and 1970, with negative and 
statistically significant estimated coefficients.  The climate variables were usually statistically 
significant, but in absence of a theory, we have little to say about their signs or magnitudes.   
The estimated coefficients on CMSA RENT/ROOM were negative and statistically 
significant across all regressions starting with the 1950 Census year.  The estimated coefficients 
ranged from -0.0011 (t =2.8) in 2000 to -0.0101 (t = 9.0) in 1970.  To gauge the economic 
magnitude of the effects we calculated the effects of a standard deviation increase in CMSA 
RENT/ROOM for each year in Table 2 on the number of births per 100 households.  Excluding 
                                                                                                                                                              
decision to have children at all and the parity decision, in which the probability of observing zero children 
is independent of the conditional mean.  Our basic results are generally robust, but these alternative 
procedures are computationally more time-consuming and complex, and convergence was occasionally not 
achieved in the more complex procedures.  OLS, in addition to being faster to compute, are more easily 
interpreted.    
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the insignificant estimate for 1940, the estimated effects ranged -3.1 in 2000 to -10.2 in 1970, 
with a median estimate of -4.2.   
Figure 3 shows the partial regression plot of fertility on real rent per room for the year 
2000.
27  Although there is considerable variation around the implied regression line, the results do 
not appear to be driven by outliers.  
8.2. Per-Square-Foot Measures from the American Housing Survey 
A negative correlation between fertility and CMSA RENT/ROOM could arise spuriously 
if larger families occupied houses and apartments with similar square footage (and hence, price) 
but smaller rooms. We used data from the metropolitan samples of the 1985-96 American 
Housing Surveys to examine whether the negative relationship between fertility and the price of 
living space disappears when the price of living space is measured on a per square foot rather 
than per room basis.  The American Housing Surveys allowed us to compute mean housing cost 
per square foot, CMSA COST/FT
2, which includes basic utilities and insurance payments in 
addition to rent or mortgage payments, as well as CMSA RENT/FT
2.  CMSA COST/FT
2 averaged 
$0.4726 (unweighted), with a standard deviation of $0.1055.  CMSA RENT/FT
2 averaged $0.34 in 
1990 (standard deviation = 0.09, and $0.53 in 2000 (standard deviation = 0.15). 
The fertility regressions were re-estimated using 1980, 1990, and 2000 households in the 
36 CMSAs common to the IPUMS and American Housing Surveys. The results are reported in 
Table 5.  Part A contains results using CMSA COST/FT
2, and Part B using CMSA RENT/FT
2.  
The estimated coefficients on the individual-level demographic controls are similar to those 
estimated for the sample as a whole.  The estimated coefficients on CMSA COST/FT
2 for the 
years 1980 and 1990 were -0.386 and -0.350, and both were statistically significant at better than 
the 1 percent level.  Each standard deviation increase in monthly housing cost per square foot 
                                                      
27 The figures were generated by regressing children ever born and instrumented real rent per room on the 
remaining covariates, retrieving the residuals, and averaging the residuals by CMSA.  The outlier, clearly 
visible at the top of the graph, is Provo-Orem, Utah.   
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(about $0.12) is associated with a reduction in fertility of about 6 children per 100 households.  
The estimated coefficient on CMSA COST/FT
2 for the year 2000 was positive but economically 
and statistically equal to zero.  Although we are disappointed, we do not think, in light of the 
small number of CMSAs, that too much weight should be attached to this last finding.   
Fertility regressions estimated for households in the American Housing Surveys are 
contained in the far right of Table 5.  The specifications were identical to those used for the 
IPUMS data, augmented to include dummy variables for year (not reported to save space). The 
estimated coefficient on CMSA COST/FT
2 was -0.43, with a standard error of 0.186 and t-statistic 
of -2.3, which is statistically significant at the 4 percent level.    
The null result for the Census year 2000 aside, the results in this section suggest that the 
negative estimated effects of CMSA RENT/ROOM on fertility are not merely spurious.   
9. Timing 
9.1. Age at First Marriage and First Birth 
Thus far, our analysis has focused on younger households, for many of whom fertility 
may not yet have been completed. The concern may therefore arise that the estimated effects of 
the price of living space indicate that households living in more expensive cities merely delay 
fertility until later in life.  We investigated this argument in two ways.  First, we estimated 
regressions for age at first marriage (1940, 1970, and 1980) and age at first birth (all years).  
Secondly, we estimated equations for cumulative lifetime fertility on households in which the 
wife is age 41 or higher, for whom fertility is presumably complete, information on which is 
available through 1990.   
OLS estimates for age at first marriage are reported in Table 6.  The estimated 
coefficients on CMSA RENT/ROOM were 0.0099 (1.56), 0.0148 (3.4), and 0.0069 (4.0) in 1940, 
1970, and 1980.  The estimated coefficient for 1940 was significant at only the 12 percent level, 
but the other 2 coefficients are significant at better than the 1 percent level.  Each standard  
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deviation in CMSA RENT/ROOM implies delays of 0.09 years (1.1 months) in 1940, 1.8 months 
in 1970, and 0.9 months in 1980.  Although small in magnitude, the estimated effects are 
consistent with those of Borsch-Supan (1986), Haurin et. al. (1993), and Hughes (2003), who 
found household formation to be slower in more expensive cities.   
Table 7 reports least-squares estimates of equations for age at first birth.  The estimated 
coefficients on CMSA RENT/ROOM are all positive and, with the exception of 1950, are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better.  Each standard deviation in rent implies a 
delay of first birth of about 1.9 months in 1940 and 1950, and about 1.3 months thereafter.   
Taken as a whole, higher housing prices appear to delay marriage and fertility, but the 
estimated magnitudes of the delays are too small to explain the negative effects on fertility itself.  
The next section offers somewhat more direct evidence on the question.   
9.2. Lifetime Fertility 
Fertility regression results for older women are presented in Table 8.  As can be seen, the 
estimated effects of CMSA RENT/ROOM are somewhat larger in magnitude than for younger 
households.  The estimated effects were not, however, statistically significant for the years 1950 
(t=-1.4) or 1990 (t=-1.3).  Recalling that the estimated effects were statistically significant for 
younger women in Table 4, there are at least two reasons why the estimates for older women 
might be less significant.  First, older families are more likely to have finished raising their 
families; current rental prices do not necessarily reflect the rental prices they faced in the past.  
Second, older families have had time in which to move away from the city in which they raised 
their children.  Despite these difficulties, all of the estimated coefficients were negative.  In 
addition, they suggest that it is lifetime fertility, and not merely the timing of births, that is 




Part of the negative correlation between fertility and the scarcity of living space could 
reflect the location decisions across CMSAs of otherwise observationally similar households with 
different underlying (unobservable) demands for children and urban amenities.  We assessed the 
importance of selection in a number of ways.   
10.1 Movers versus Stayers 
First, we estimated equations for number of children in the household by mobility status.  
If our results are driven mainly by selection of high-fertility households into less-expensive 
CMSAs, the estimated effects of the price of living space on fertility should be smaller and less 
significant for households that have not moved recently.  Short stayers are defined as households 
in which the wife lives in the same metropolitan area (METAREAD) as 5 years ago, but lives in a 
state different than her state of birth.  Long stayers are defined as households in which the wife 
lives in the same metropolitan area as 5 years ago, and her current state of residence is the same 
as her state of birth.  All other households are called movers.     
We re-estimated the fertility equations for number of children in the household by 
mobility status, and present the estimated coefficients on CMSA RENT/ROOM in Table 9.  The 
estimated coefficients for short stayers were somewhat larger in magnitude than for the sample as 
a whole (Table 4) except for 1970, and were significant at the 9 percent level in 1940, the 8 
percent level in 1990, and at better than the 1 percent level in the remaining years.  The estimated 
coefficients for movers were positive in 1940 and 1950, and negative and significant for the years 
1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  The estimated effects for short stayers and movers were generally 
of similar magnitude.  These results are inconsistent with the notion that selection is primarily 
responsible for our findings.   
The estimated coefficients for long stayers were negative and statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level for the years 1950, 1970, and 1990, but not for the other years.  Although this 
might be taken as evidence in favor of selective migration, such an explanation would have to  
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explain why the estimated effects of the price of living space differ for stayers living inside and 
outside of their state of birth.  One might posit, for example, that long stayers have higher 
mobility costs on average, and hence are less able to adjust their location to desired fertility.   
The selection story has four implications. First, if households that move are sorting across 
CMSAs based on desired fertility, there is less reason to expect any relationship between fertility 
and the price of living space in the origin  CMSA.  Second, households with higher desired 
fertility should be more likely to move out of expensive CMSAs.  Third, among households that 
choose to move, those with larger families should choose less expensive destinations.  Finally, the 
selection story implies that choice of location between CMSAs is a more important determinant 
of the price of living space than choice of location within  CMSAs.  These implications are 
examined in the remainder of the paper.   
10.2 Mover Fertility and Rent in Origin CMSA 
If causality runs primarily from desired fertility to the price of living space, there is no 
reason to expect a negative relationship between the fertility among movers and the price of 
living space in their origin CMSA.  Table 10 reports fertility regressions for movers as a function 
of  CMSA RENT/ROOM in the origin CMSA.  Although the magnitudes and statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients on origin CMSA RENT/ROOM were somewhat smaller 
than those for current CMSA RENT/ROOM, they were negative and statistically significant at the 
5 percent level nonetheless: -0.0013 (t=-2.4), -0.0007 (t=-2.1), and -0.0005 (t=-2.1).  These 
results are further evidence that our findings are not driven purely by selection.   
10.3 Mobility between CMSAs and Fertility 
We next examine whether larger households are more likely to leave more expensive 
cities.  We are able to observe CMSA of residence 5 years prior to the Census survey from 1980 
onward.  We estimated a linear probability model for whether the household lived in a different 
CMSA than 5 years ago as a function of CMSA RENT/ROOM in the origin CMSA, number of  
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children in the household at the survey date, and their interaction.  If large families tend to leave 
expensive CMSAs, the interaction should have a positive estimated coefficient.  The regressions 
control for age and education as of the 2000 Census survey date, race, labor force participation of 
the wife, and dummy variables for Census region.  Again, we treat the number of children as 
exogenous.   
The regression results are contained in Table 11.  Focusing on the estimated coefficients 
of interest, number of children in the household entered with negative and statistically significant 
estimated coefficients.  Each additional child is estimated to reduce the probability of moving 
between CMSAs by between 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points.  The estimated coefficients on the 
interaction between CMSA RENT/ROOM and number of children were positive, but they were 
small in magnitude and with the exception of the year 2000, were statistically insignificant.  Even 
for the year 2000, the total effect of family size on mobility becomes positive only at rents of 
$422 per room per month, a figure higher than observed in the data.  This evidence is not 
consistent with strong sorting of larger households into less expensive CMSAs.      
10.4 Housing Costs and Location Choice 
Consider a household that relocates from neighborhood n in CMSA c to neighborhood n’ 
in CMSA c’.  The difference in the rent in the two locations can be expressed as the sum of 
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where R denotes the CMSA RENT/ROOM, and a bar denotes the mean price of living space 
within the CMSA.  The first term is equal to the within-CMSA deviation in housing prices in the 
neighborhood from the CMSA mean in the new location, the second is (minus) the within-CMSA 
deviation in the old location, and the third term is equal to the difference between CMSA means.  
If within-CMSA mobility is more important than between-CMSA mobility, family size should be 
more negatively correlated with  '' ' () nc c R R − (in the population as a whole) than  ' () cc R R − .    
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We focus first on households that moved between metropolitan areas.  The third term on 
the right-hand side can be constructed for all households that moved between CMSAs.  We 
regressed  ' () cc R R −  on the number of children and other individual-level covariates.  The 
regression results are shown in Table 12.  The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on the number of 
children was -0.24 (-1.9) in 1980, -0.55 (-2.7) in 1990, and -1.15 (-2.3) in 2000.  These 
coefficients imply that among households that moved between metropolitan areas, each additional 
child is associated with a decline in mean CMSA RENT/ROOM of between $0.24 and $1.15 per 
month.  However, it should still be kept in mind that the presence of children in the household is 
associated with a lower probability of moving between CMSAs in the first place.   
We turn next to location within the CMSA as measured by  '' ' () nc c R R − , or OWN 
RENT/ROOM minus CMSA RENT/ROOM.  Although we do not have information on average 
rents at the neighborhood level, the IPUMS data do contain information on each household’s 
rental expenditure or, for owners, dwelling value in the current location, information that allows 
us to proxy the first term on the right-hand side.  We address two questions.  The first is the 
relationship between  '' ' () nc c R R −  and the number of children in the household.
28  The second is 
whether the weaker relationship between fertility and CMSA RENT/ROOM among long stayers 
might reflect differences in housing choices between stayers and movers.  We estimated 
regressions for  '' ' () nc c R R −  as a function of mobility status using two specifications.  The first 
augments the list of regressors to include intercept shifters for mobility status and the second 
allows mobility status to interact with CMSA RENT/ROOM.   
The regression results are reported in Table 13.  The estimated coefficients (t-statistics) 
on the number of children are all negative and statistically significant, ranging from -3.69 (-7.7) 
                                                      
28 For renters, Rnc was computed as monthly contract rent divided by rooms occupied; for owners, we 
converted value per room into rent per room based on bivariate CMSA-level regressions of median value 
per room on median rent per room for each year.    
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in 1980 to -7.54 (t=-6.7) in the year 2000. Thus, each additional child implies a reduction in OWN 
RENT/ROOM of between roughly $4 and $8 per month relative to CMSA RENT/ROOM, which 
estimated coefficients are much larger in magnitude than those estimated for movers between 
CMSAs.  These estimates suggest that the relationship between housing expenditures and fertility 
is more a function of mobility within a CMSA than between CMSAs.   
The likelihood of selection bias across CMSAs is reduced if households in even 
expensive CMSAs can find relatively inexpensive housing.  Information about the CMSA is 
likely to be greater among households that have lived there a longer time.  Such households might 
therefore be expected to make more efficient location choices, and hence spend less on housing 
than households that have recently moved into the CMSA.  The models that include mobility 
intercept shifters indicate that long stayers paid between $7.50 and $16 per room less than 
otherwise comparable movers, and that short stayers paid between $6.25 and $12.65 per room 
less.  The models that include interactions of the mobility indicators with CMSA RENT/ROOM 
suggest that the stayer-mover differentials are larger in more expensive CMSAs.   
To summarize the findings of this section, among movers, the difference in rents between 
the destination and origin CMSA is smaller (more negative), the larger the number of children in 
the household.   This is evidence that causality indeed may run from fertility to rent rather than 
the other way around.  However, our concern about reverse causality is mitigated by a number of 
factors.  First, mover fertility is inversely related to rents in the origin CMSA.  It is difficult to 
explain why this should be the case if one believes simultaneously that (1) migration decisions 
are as rationally forecasted as fertility decisions and (2) causality runs entirely from fertility to 
location choice.  Second, within the range of rents observed in our data, the presence of children 
reduces the probability of moving between CMSAs, even for larger families in more expensive 
CMSAs.  It is difficult to believe that this should be the case if reverse causality is entirely 
responsible for the negative correlation between fertility and rent, unless one believes that 
households.  Finally, we find that long-time residents of in any given CMSA pay lower rents than  
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do recent migrants.  This last fact suggests that longer-time residents of a CMSA are better 
informed and make more efficient location decisions, and could help explain why the estimated 
relationship between fertility and CMSA average rents is weaker for stayers than for movers.   
11 Tests for Endogeneity  
This section presents Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity of CMSA RENT/ROOM.  
These tests involve estimation of a first-stage regression for CMSA RENT/ROOM as a function of 
appropriate instruments, and estimating the fertility regression in the second stage augmented to 
include the residual from the first stage.  Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), these 
instruments included construction costs from R.S. Means (2000) augmented with one of three sets 
of instrumental variables: (1) birth-state instruments; (2) current-state instruments; and (3) birth 
and state instruments combined.  The variables included measures of educational attainment, 
climate, family income, female labor force participation, as well as state-level measures of rent 
per room (except for 1960) and population density.  F-tests, not shown to save space, indicated 
that weak instruments were not a problem.  
Table 14 reports probability values for Hansen’s J-test of exogeneity (appropriateness) of 
the instruments.  The exogeneity of the birth-state instruments is rejected at the 7 percent level or 
better in virtually year.  In light of the J-test results, we focus on the results using only current-
state instruments. 
29 Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of the null hypothesis that CMSA RENT/ROOM is 
exogenous can be rejected at the 10% percent level or better for only the year 1960, although the 
probability value for the year 1970 is close at 13.4%.   
Table 14 presents IV estimates of the coefficient on CMSA RENT/ROOM for all years 
using current-state instruments.  The estimated IV coefficient estimates were negative from 1950 
                                                      
29 Some readers may object to the use of current-state instruments on the grounds that households choose 
their state.  The question is not, however, whether households choose their location – of course, they do – 
but whether this choice is correlated with the error term in the fertility equation once one has controlled for 
other factors.  Considering the large number of covariates in our regressions, including controls for climate, 
it is not surprising to us that our instruments pass tests for overidentification.    
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onward.  Although the IV estimates were not statistically significant at conventional levels for 
1990 and 2000, they do not miss by much, with t-values were -1.5 and -1.2.  Our disappointment 
is further tempered by the fact that there is no evidence of endogeneity bias in those years.   
More problematic is the year 1960, for which the estimated IV coefficient is -0.0015 with 
a t-statistic of just -0.5.  Because the finest level of geographic detail for 1960 is the state, and the 
fertility regressions include a number of state-level variables as control variables, the ability of 
additional state-level variables to identify variations across states in CMSA RENT/ROOM is 
limited.   
To get around the lack of CMSA-level information for 1960, we estimated IV fertility 
regressions using data on wives between the ages of 25 and 50 – wives who would have been 
between the ages of 15 and 40 in 1960 -- using 1970 data.  Because children are more likely to 
have left households of older wives, we take as our dependent variable the number of children 
ever born.  To reduce the chance that the sample contains wives who moved between CMSAs, we 
focused on long stayers, that is, on wives who lived in the same CMSA as 5 years previously and 
in the wife’s state of birth.   
To save space, we merely summarize the main findings here.  The estimated OLS 
coefficient on real rent per room was -0.0145, with a t-statistic of -8.1.  The estimated IV 
coefficient was -0.0807, with a t-statistic of -2.0.  These IV results contrast sharply with those 
found using 1960 state-level data, and are more in line with those found for other years.   
Although we cannot be certain, these findings are at least consistent with our hypothesis that the 
weak results using 1960 data are due to the lack of geographic detail below the state level.    
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11. Concluding Remarks 
Controlling for a broad array of individual-level and city-level characteristics, our 
estimates suggest that the price of living space has had a small but economically and statistically 
significant effect on the fertility decisions of households.  How much of the variation in fertility 
across cities can be accounted for by variation in the price of housing?  CMSA RENT/ROOM 
averaged $130 in the year 2000 across the 276 CMSAs, and the standard deviation was about 
$30.  Cities with unit prices close to the mean included Reading, PA, Cedar Rapids, IA, St. Louis, 
MO, and Columbia, SC.  The regression estimates for the year 2000 imply that fertility in cities 
with rents a standard deviation above the mean (Salt Lake City, UT, Portland, OR, and Houston, 
TX) should have been lower by about 0.03, or about 18 percent of the cross-city standard 
deviation of mean fertility of about 0.17, and about 0.06 lower in cities with rents two standard 
deviations above the mean (New Haven, CT, Seattle, WA, and Denver, CO).   
One puzzle is why the results for the year 2000 are weaker than for prior census years.  In 
experiments not reported here, we considered a number of possibilities.  For example, family 
income has risen over time, and some have speculated that this might weaken the rent-fertility 
relationship.  However, we controlled for the most important determinants of income in our 
regressions, and controlled for citywide median family income in our (admittedly cross-sectional) 
empirical work.  We found no evidence that the relationship was weaker for families in higher-
income states.  Another possible explanation is the increase in the percentage of households of 
Hispanic origin.  However, deleting Hispanic households from the sample did not strengthen the 
fertility-rent relationship.    
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One admittedly speculative possibility that might be explored in the future is the role of 
U.S. housing markets in the accumulation of wealth.  The price of housing relative to other goods 
and services in the economy fell between the 1940s and about 1970, and then began to rise.  If 
families began viewing the purchase of real estate not simply as an input into household 
production, but as an element of their portfolio of wealth, the most expensive cities may also have 
offered superior returns on their investment, an effect that could weaken or even offset any 
possible negative effects of the price of housing on fertility.   
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Appendix B: Constructing a Deflator for Housing 
We began with the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ price index for rent of primary residence 
(series CUUR0000SEHA).  Although this index is for rental housing only, the BEA relies heavily 
on the rental price index to construct the deflators for owners (Crone et. al. 2004, p. 26).  Recent 
research suggests that this index is biased downward (Gordon and vanGoethem, 2005; Crone et. 
al. 2004).
30  Based on the findings of Gordon and vanGoethem (2005, p. 44) we have adjusted the 
rental inflation index upward by a percentage point per year.
31  To construct the numeraire, we 
first adjusted the overall CPI based on the findings of Costa (2001).
32  The numeraire is then 
computed as CPIX = (CPI – wH*CPIH)/(1-wH), where CPIH denotes the price index for housing 
and wH is housing’s share in the overall CPI.  Housing share was set at a relatively conservative 
wH = 0.25 for the entire period.
33   
                                                      
30 Margo (1996) found that correcting for biases in measuring housing prices reduced estimates of real 
wage growth between the 1830s and 1850s by about 7 percent (pp. 621-2).   
31Constructing an index that includes owner-occupied housing is beyond the scope of our paper.  Costa 
(2001) suggests that such an index would exhibit greater volatility because housing prices are more volatile 
than rents.  This omission biases the CPI downward during the housing boom in the first half of the 1920s 
and upward from the 1925 peak to the 1935 trough in housing markets (p. 1303). 
32She found the CPI to be biased downward by 0.1 percent between 1914 and 1918; upward by 0.7 percent 
per year between 1919 and 1935; upward by 0.4 percent during the 1960s; upward by 2.7 between 1970 
and 1982; and upward by 0.6 percent between 1983 and 1994.  In absence of evidence for the periods 1936-
1949 and 1994 onward, we assumed that the 1960s bias of 0.4 percent applied during the former and that 
1980s-90s bias of 0.6 percent applied during the latter.   
33For example, in 2001-2002, rent of shelter comprised 32.5 percent of the CPI-U, but we did not have 
information for all years readily available.  Small changes in the weights will have only minor impacts on 
the resulting relative price series.   
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Appendix A. Cities in American Housing Survey                      
City  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Anaheim   X      X    X      
Atlanta     X      X       X 
Baltimore     X      X       
Birmingham     X     X      
Boston  X    X      X     
Buffalo      X        X    
Charlotte             X   
Chicago     X      X       
Cincinnati   X     X        
Cleveland     X     X      X 
Columbus     X      X      X   
Dallas  X      X       X    
DC  X    X      X     
Denver    X      X       X   
Detroit  X    X      X     
Fort  Worth  X      X       X    
Hartford     X      X       X 
Houston     X      X       
Indianapolis     X     X      X 
Kansas City     X        X          X   
Los  Angeles  X    X         
Memphis     X     X      X 
Miami    X      X       X   
Milwaukee      X        X    
Minneapolis  X    X      X     
New  Orleans    X      X       X   
New  York     X      X       
Newark     X      X       
Norfolk     X     X      
Oklahoma  City     X     X      X 
Philadelphia  X    X         
Phoenix  X      X       X    
Pittsburgh    X      X       X   
Portland  OR    X      X       X   
Providence     X     X      
Rochester   X     X        
Sacramento              X 
Salt  Lake  City     X     X      
San  Antonio    X      X       X   
San  Bernardino    X      X      X    
San  Diego     X      X     X    
San  Francisco  X    X      X     
San  Jose     X      X     
Seattle     X      X       X 
St  Louis     X      X       X 
Tampa  X    X      X     
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Appendix B: Constructing a Deflator for Housing 
We began with the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ price index for rent of primary residence 
(series CUUR0000SEHA).  Although this index is for rental housing only, the BEA relies heavily 
on the rental price index to construct the deflators for owners (Crone et. al. 2004, p. 26).  Recent 
research suggests that this index is biased downward (Gordon and vanGoethem, 2005; Crone et. 
al. 2004).
34  Based on the findings of Gordon and vanGoethem (2005, p. 44) we have adjusted the 
rental inflation index upward by a percentage point per year.
35  To construct the numeraire, we 
first adjusted the overall CPI based on the findings of Costa (2001).
36  The numeraire is then 
computed as CPIX = (CPI – wH*CPIH)/(1-wH), where CPIH denotes the price index for housing 
and wH is housing’s share in the overall CPI.  Housing share was set at a relatively conservative 
wH = 0.25 for the entire period.
37    
                                                      
34 Margo (1996) found that correcting for biases in measuring housing prices reduced estimates of real 
wage growth between the 1830s and 1850s by about 7 percent (pp. 621-2).   
35Constructing an index that includes owner-occupied housing is beyond the scope of our paper.  Costa 
(2001) suggests that such an index would exhibit greater volatility because housing prices are more volatile 
than rents.  This omission biases the CPI downward during the housing boom in the first half of the 1920s 
and upward from the 1925 peak to the 1935 trough in housing markets (p. 1303). 
36She found the CPI to be biased downward by 0.1 percent between 1914 and 1918; upward by 0.7 percent 
per year between 1919 and 1935; upward by 0.4 percent during the 1960s; upward by 2.7 between 1970 
and 1982; and upward by 0.6 percent between 1983 and 1994.  In absence of evidence for the periods 1936-
1949 and 1994 onward, we assumed that the 1960s bias of 0.4 percent applied during the former and that 
1980s-90s bias of 0.6 percent applied during the latter.   
37For example, in 2001-2002, rent of shelter comprised 32.5 percent of the CPI-U, but we did not have 
information for all years readily available.  Small changes in the weights will have only minor impacts on 
the resulting relative price series.   
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Table 1. Mean Children in Household and CMSA RENT/ROOM in 40 Largest CMSAs: Younger Households, 
2000 
  Children  
CMSA 
RENT/ROOM 
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill, NC MSA  1.32    $               166  
Nashville, TN MSA  1.46    $               146  
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA  1.46    $               127  
Austin--San Marcos, TX MSA  1.47    $               197  
San Francisco--Oakland--San Jose, CA CMSA  1.47    $               284  
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA  1.47    $               148  
Atlanta, GA MSA  1.48    $               178  
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA  1.49    $               157  
Washington--Baltimore, DC--MD--VA--WV CMSA  1.49    $               187  
Seattle--Tacoma--Bremerton, WA CMSA  1.49    $               192  
New Haven--Meriden, CT NECMA  1.50    $               189  
Denver--Boulder--Greeley, CO CMSA  1.50    $               194  
New Orleans, LA MSA  1.50    $               131  
Boston--Worcestor--Lawrence, MA--NH--ME--CT NECMA  1.51    $               181  
Norfolk--Virginia Beach--Newport News, VA--NC MSA  1.52    $               140  
Columbus--Newark, OH PMSA  1.53    $               136  
Miami--Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA  1.54    $               222  
Kansas City, MO--KS MSA  1.55    $               139  
Pittsburgh, PA MSA  1.56    $               114  
New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island, NY--NJ--CT--PA CMSA  1.57    $               215  
Dallas--Fort Worth, TX CMSA  1.57    $               174  
Portland--Salem, OR--WA CMSA  1.58    $               165  
Orlando, FL MSA  1.58    $               174  
Philadelphia--Wilmington--Atlantic City, PA--NJ--DE--MD CMSA  1.59    $               168  
San Diego, CA MSA  1.60    $               211  
Milwaukee--Racine, WI CMSA  1.60    $               146  
Indianapolis, IN MSA  1.60    $               139  
Cincinnati--Hamilton, OH--KY--IN CMSA  1.61    $               127  
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI MSA  1.62    $               178  
Las Vegas, NV--AZ MSA  1.62    $               182  
Chicago--Gary--Kenosha, IL--IN--WI CMSA  1.63    $               167  
Detroit--Ann Arbor--Flint, MI CMSA  1.64    $               145  
St. Louis, MO--IL MSA  1.64    $               131  
Cleveland--Akron, OH CMSA  1.66    $               127  
San Antonio, TX MSA  1.68    $               144  
Houston--Galveston--Brazoria, TX CMSA  1.69    $               163  
Sacramento--Yolo, CA CMSA  1.73    $               175  
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ MSA  1.73    $               177  
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA  1.78    $               160  
Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County, CA CMSA  1.81    $               226  
          
 Note: Mean children in household taken from IPUMS 2000 household data, weighted by person weight  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics, IPUMS and CMSA-Level Data                                  
Part A: IPUMS Households                     
  1940  1950   1960   1970   1980    1990 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Mean 
Children  in  household  1.448  1.500 1.466 1.338 2.154 1.616 2.032  1.592 1.622 1.290 1.553
Children  ever  born  1.539  1.615 1.602 1.476 2.292 1.747 2.152  1.739 1.706 1.390 1.621
Years  ed,  female  9.309  3.223 10.545 2.987 10.921 2.810 11.846  2.550 12.551 2.476 13.236
Years  ed,  male  9.134  3.643 0.000 0.000 10.743 3.453 12.025  3.060 12.850 2.761 13.362
Age,  female  30.654  5.932 30.197 5.961 30.337 6.271 29.633  6.211 30.100 5.789 31.593
Age,  male  34.835  7.625 … … 33.963 7.809 32.877  7.872 32.996 7.254 34.480
Black  female  0.074  0.262 0.084 0.277 0.084 0.278 0.099  0.298 0.082 0.275 0.076
Hispanic  female  0.020  0.141 0.023 0.150 0.027 0.163 0.056  0.230 0.080 0.271 0.109
Other  female  0.002  0.042 0.003 0.056 0.009 0.097 0.018  0.133 0.036 0.187 0.052
Foreign  born  0.197  0.398 0.064 0.245 0.091 0.288 0.159  0.366 0.140 0.347 0.187
Central  city  0.552  0.497 0.500 0.500 0.265 0.441 0.000  0.000 0.277 0.448 0.206
Unknown  central  city  0.113  0.316 0.114 0.318 0.028 0.164 0.000  0.000 0.163 0.369 0.355
Female  LF  participant  0.194  0.396 0.259 0.438 0.305 0.461 0.410  0.492 0.591 0.492 0.705
Mid  Atlantic  0.319  0.466 0.279 0.448 0.183 0.387 0.221  0.415 0.168 0.374 0.163
East  north  central  0.242  0.429 0.225 0.418 0.204 0.403 0.204  0.403 0.190 0.392 0.162
West  north  central  0.060  0.237 0.058 0.235 0.083 0.276 0.050  0.218 0.048 0.213 0.050
South  Atlantic  0.095  0.293 0.105 0.307 0.147 0.354 0.119  0.324 0.146 0.354 0.161
East  south  central  0.041  0.198 0.041 0.198 0.066 0.248 0.020  0.140 0.045 0.208 0.043
West  south  central  0.059  0.235 0.072 0.258 0.098 0.297 0.087  0.281 0.107 0.309 0.112
Mountain  0.012  0.110 0.019 0.135 0.041 0.198 0.033  0.179 0.046 0.210 0.051
Pacific  0.095  0.293 0.128 0.334 0.124 0.329 0.182  0.386 0.173 0.379 0.192
                      
Observations  24,655    34,544   205,462   254,779     174,038   167,861
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Table 2, Continued.                   
Part B: CMSA-Level Data (276 CMSAs)                   
                      
 CMSA RENT/ROOM    $   24.16  $     8.93  $   31.90  $     6.48    $   46.42  $     9.40    $   52.17   $   10.09    $   72.66  $   11.02    $   88.94 
Female  LFP  rate  0.253  0.053 0.304 0.222 0.354 0.091 0.411  0.045 0.500 0.051 0.563
%  College  grads  0.048  0.017 0.063 0.024 0.083 0.024 0.111  0.042 0.162 0.053 0.194
%  Catholic  0.119  0.131 0.160 0.164 0.210 0.136 0.173  0.157 0.166 0.142 0.169
 Real family income    $ 35,308  $   7,728  $ 20,511  $   4,489    $ 32,690  $   6,709    $ 39,676   $   6,164    $ 40,006  $   5,268    $ 43,492 
  Ln(Real  family  income)  10.445  0.239 9.902 0.239 10.370 0.218 10.576  0.162 10.588 0.135 10.669
Heating  degree  days  4424.1  2262.0 4424.1 2262.0 4687.0 1924.6 4424.1  2262.0 4424.1 2262.0 4424.1
Cooling  degree  days  1425.5  963.9 1425.5 963.9 1155.1 756.6 1425.5  963.9 1425.5 963.9 1425.5
Average  precipitation  37.5  14.1 37.5 14.1 37.3 11.7 37.5  14.1 37.5 14.1 37.5
                                                
 Note: Summary statistics in Part A are weighted by person line weight except for 1940 and 1950, which are weighted by sample line weight.  
Summary statistics in Part B  are  unweighted.                      
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Table 3.  Demand for Living Space, IPUMS and AHS Data                             
  Number of Rooms, IPUMS: Price of Living Space = Median Rent per Room   AHS: Price of Living Space = 
  1970  1980    1990   2000   Monthly  Housing  Cost/Ft
2  
                           
rooms  Coef. t  Coef. t    Coef.  t    Coef.  t    Coef.  t   
                           
Number of children  0.29 22.0 0.29 24.9  0.29 25.6  0.29 28.9 75.5 24.1 
CMSA RENT/ROOM  -0.02  -6.0 -0.01 -6.1 -0.01 -7.8  -0.01  -7.6  -1684.3 -8.9 
Years ed, female  0.06  28.8 0.08 27.2  0.09 25.9  0.09  33.7  31.8 17.2 
Years ed, male  0.08  40.9 0.11 32.4  0.10 18.0  0.09  16.8  41.6 14.2 
Female 15-20  -0.43  -16.3 -0.42 -12.8  -0.33 -7.5  -0.14  -2.5  -41.3 -2.4 
Female 21-25  -0.31  -31.9 -0.29 -19.0  -0.29 -13.2  -0.26  -10.1  -68.1 -7.9 
Female 31-35  0.19  19.1 0.27 26.4  0.24 18.6  0.31  18.5  82.3 12.5 
Female 36-40  0.33  21.8 0.42 32.7  0.45 24.1  0.51  30.5  173.9 19.1 
Male 15-20  -0.12  -3.1 -0.27 -7.9  -0.19 -2.8  -0.06  -1.1  -83.2 -3.1 
Male 21-25  -0.27  -14.0 -0.24 -16.0  -0.27 -9.5  -0.18  -7.2  -53.9 -6.0 
Male 31-35  0.17  10.5 0.24 15.9  0.25 17.6  0.22  14.8  74.0 8.7 
Male 36-40  0.26  16.0 0.34 16.4  0.38 23.1  0.38  17.6  137.7 12.4 
Male 41+  0.29  13.8 0.33 12.8  0.51 22.9  0.41  14.0  187.9 15.9 
Black female  -0.40  -8.0 -0.46 -17.2  -0.55 -17.6  -0.52  -20.8  -69.6 -3.6 
Hispanic female  -0.37  -12.8 -0.37 -9.5  -0.48 -12.2  -0.23  -6.0  -57.5 -4.2 
Other female  -0.63  -16.4 -0.62 -13.7  -0.72 -19.3  -0.37  -9.1  -146.4 -9.7 
Foreign Born  -0.17  -5.7 -0.30 -7.9  -0.42 -11.5  -0.69  -17.3  …  …   
Central city  …  …  -0.30 -3.3  -0.46 -3.9  -0.56  -4.6  -57.7 -3.7 
Unknown cc  …  …  -0.13 -4.8  -0.17 -4.3  -0.20  -4.5  …  …   
Female LF participant  -0.13  -16.3 -0.02 -1.5  -0.01 -0.4  0.04  4.4  -39.6 -4.8 
% college grads  0.72  0.9 0.54 1.1  0.02 0.1  -0.07  -0.1  -428.3 -0.5 
% Catholic  -0.08  -0.8 -0.02 -0.2  0.43 3.5  0.10  0.6  642.4 6.1 
ln (Real fam inc)  1.84  5.4 1.11 5.1  1.42 4.8  1.27  3.6  545.1 1.7 
% Female LFP  -0.27  -0.5 -0.02 0.0  0.46 0.8  0.87  1.2  1690.2 2.4 
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Table 3, Continued. 
Avg precipitation  0.00  2.6 0.00 0.7  0.00 -1.8  0.00  -1.1  -1.5 -1.0 
Heat deg days  0.00  0.2 0.00 1.2  0.00 -0.2  0.00  1.8  0.0 -0.5 
Cool deg days  0.00  0.4 0.00 1.0  0.00 -0.9  0.00  0.8  0.0 -1.8 
Mid Atlantic  0.04  0.9 0.15 2.5  0.05 1.3  0.22  2.8  3.4 1.3 
East north central  0.00  -0.1 0.03 0.7  -0.01 -0.2  0.09  1.2  4.1 0.7 
West north central  -0.02  -0.3 0.03 0.7  0.02 0.2  0.14  1.7  -6.3 -1.7 
South Atlantic  0.23  3.1 0.26 4.4  0.21 2.0  0.30  2.9  5.7 3.7 
East south central  -0.04  -0.5 0.09 1.5  0.09 0.9  0.24  2.5  9.8 1.5 
West south central  -0.08  -0.9 -0.03 -0.6  -0.10 -1.1  0.13  1.3  -3.2 -0.7 
Mountain 0.25  1.8 0.30 3.2  -0.05 -0.6  0.15  1.5  7.9 0.6 
Pacific 0.15  1.5 0.12 1.3  -0.04 -0.5  -0.01  -0.1  -16.4 -3.3 
Intercept -15.45  -4.6 -8.20 -3.8  -11.44 -4.2  -10.76  -3.0  -5454.0 -1.6 
                           
R-Square  0.3075   0.3029    0.3092    0.3166     0.2224   
Observations  253,130   172,944    166,854    166,161     76,095   
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Table 4. OLS Regressions for Children in the Household, Young IPUMS
Households                                     
  1940   1950  1960   1970   1980   1990   2000 
                                 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
CMSA RENT/ROOM  -0.0004 -0.2  -0.0067 -4.0 -0.0070 -2.7  -0.0101 -9.0 -0.0039 -5.5 -0.0019 -3.2 -0.0011 -2.8
Other CMSA-Level Contr o l s                                 
% college grads  -1.2377 -0.6  1.2464 1.4 2.7493 1.5  0.6093 1.9  0.1356 0.5  -0.2350 -0.9  -0.1684 -0.6
% Catholic  -0.4323 -2.3  -0.1815 -2.4 0.2440 1.4  0.2634 3.3 -0.0439 -0.7 -0.0293 -0.5 -0.0534 -0.7
ln(Real fam income)  -0.7309 -3.5  -0.1582 -1.4 -0.6294 -3.0 0.2821 2.4  -0.1610 -2.0  -0.2443 -2.8 -0.1913 -2.0
% Fem LFP in CMSA  -0.9927 -1.5  -0.0150 -1.6 0.0838 0.2 0.0913 0.3  -0.1140 -0.4 0.4989 1.7 0.1416 0.4
Avg precip  -0.0020 -0.8  0.0007 0.8 -0.0010 -0.8  -0.0007 -0.9 -0.0014 -2.2 -0.0024 -3.0 -0.0023 -2.9
Heating  deg  days  0.0001 2.2  0.0001 4.7 0.0001 5.4 0.0001 7.2 0.0000 6.5 0.0000 3.9 0.0000 3.5
Cooling deg day  0.0000 -0.7  0.0001 2.0 0.0001 2.1  0.0002 6.1  0.0001 4.1  0.0001 3.0  0.0000 2.6
Individual-Level Covariates                                
Years ed, female  -0.0557 -13.5  -0.0542 -16.7 -0.0402 -10.5 -0.0734 -12.0 -0.0816 -27.3 -0.0728 -19.0 -0.0651 -19.3
Years ed, male  -0.0447 -9.6  …  …  -0.0289 -12.2  -0.0242 -18.5 -0.0309 -20.4 -0.0279 -14.6 -0.0331 -21.6
Female age 15-20  -0.5240 -13.3  -0.9092 -25.0 -1.0122 -35.9 -1.0336 -34.1 -0.8022 -48.8 -0.6913 -33.7 -0.6413 -32.8
Female age 21-25  -0.2204 -7.6  -0.4568 -24.0 -0.4691 -38.3  -0.5894 -42.6 -0.4299 -49.9 -0.3383 -34.9 -0.2765 -25.9
Female  age  31-35  0.2511 9.7  0.2495 10.1 0.1387 9.2 0.5167 45.9 0.4020 42.2 0.3309 35.1 0.3299 36.0
Female  age  36-40  0.4251 10.7  0.2779 6.3 0.0410 1.4 0.6083 29.9 0.6418 38.4 0.4612 23.4 0.4644 29.9
Male age 15-20  -0.1839 -2.2  …  …  -0.6017 -18.1  -0.4520 -24.7 -0.3599 -18.0 -0.2939 -9.8 -0.3352 -9.5
Male age 21-25  -0.1578 -5.7  …  …  -0.2906 -22.1  -0.2888 -38.8 -0.2135 -19.3 -0.1935 -9.6 -0.1188 -8.4
Male  age  31-35  0.1772 6.0  … …  0.2430 17.5 0.3018 28.7 0.1954 29.3 0.2435 24.0 0.2308 28.0
Male  age  36-40  0.2956 8.1  … …  0.3466 21.9 0.4483 26.8 0.3646 43.6 0.3621 33.6 0.4217 36.9
Male  age  41+  0.3563 8.0  … …  0.1285 6.0 0.2014 10.8 0.2088 10.7 0.1435 8.7 0.2819 16.3
Black  female  -0.1714 -3.4  0.0393 0.9 0.3261 6.4 0.3123 9.3 0.4309 26.0 0.3210 18.9 0.2990 18.6
Hispanic  female  0.4922 5.2  0.4787 5.1 0.4162 3.9 0.2721 4.6 0.2861 8.8 0.2294 7.1 0.2356 7.5
Other female  0.7098 2.4  -0.0479 -0.5 -0.0127 -0.3  -0.0865 -2.0 0.0574 2.9  -0.0053 -0.3 0.0165 1.4
Foreign born   0.0565 1.9  -0.1291 -4.7 -0.2395 -9.8  -0.3273 -28.0 -0.1137 -11.7 -0.0087 -0.5 -0.0885 -9.9
Central City  -0.2048 -7.4  -0.2012 -10.3 -0.1738 -6.4 … …    -0.1177 -9.3  -0.1077 -9.2  -0.1288 -9.2
Unknown CC  -0.1180 -2.8  -0.0426 -1.5 -0.1500 -3.7 … …    -0.0088 -0.6 -0.0165 -1.3 -0.0362 -3.0
Female LF Participant  -0.8222 -43.4  -0.8179 -58.1 -0.8120 -45.8 -0.6067 -33.6 -0.5264 -40.1 -0.5356 -48.9 -0.4406 -39.1 
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Table 4, Continued. 
Mid Atlantic  -0.1413 -2.0  -0.1297 -3.4 -0.1382 -3.9 -0.1157 -4.0 -0.0283 -1.4 -0.0314 -1.4 -0.0069 -0.3
East north central  -0.1157 -1.4  -0.0694 -1.5 0.1049 1.6  0.0082 0.3  0.0310 1.5  0.0028 0.1  0.0157 0.8
West  north  central  -0.1998 -2.1  -0.1175 -2.3 0.0674 1.2 0.0586 1.6 0.0377 1.5 0.0155 0.6 0.0534 2.3
South Atlantic  -0.0586 -0.7  -0.0887 -1.8 -0.0081 -0.1 -0.0063 -0.2 -0.0650 -2.7 -0.0883 -3.5 -0.0565 -2.0
East south central  -0.1729 -1.6  -0.0058 -0.1 -0.0344 -0.4 -0.0531 -1.1 -0.0594 -2.2 -0.0781 -2.7 -0.0664 -2.0
West south central  0.0164 0.1  0.0419 0.8 0.0545 0.9  -0.0334 -0.9  0.0379 1.3  -0.0201 -0.6  0.0015 0.1
Mountain  -0.0574 -0.2  0.1168 1.4 …  …   0.0916 1.1 0.0941 1.0 0.0081 0.1 0.0362 0.6
Pacific  -0.0871 -0.7  0.0555 0.9 0.2654 4.0 0.2955 5.7 0.1365 3.9 0.1014 2.3 0.1020 2.5
Intercept  10.5509 4.9  3.8066 3.3 9.2608 4.3 0.1197 0.1 4.8974 6.0 5.4086 6.3 4.9075 4.8
                                 
R-Square  0.2094    0.1734  0.1913    0.3096   0.3046   0.2094   0.1903 
Observations  24,655    34,544    119,816       253,130    172,944    166,854    166,161 
Clusters  117    127  32    103   218   224   237 
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Table 5. Fertility and Price of Living Space per Square Foot: IPUMS and AHS Households in 36 
CMSAs    
 IPUMS  Households  AHS Households 
 1980  1990  2000  1985-1996 
A. Main Results              
             
 Coef. Z  Coef. Z  Coef. Z  Coef. Z  
REAL COST/FT
2 -0.5547  -6.5 -0.5131 -6.2 0.0299 0.3 -0.4343 -2.3
Other CMSA-Level Controls           
% college grads  0.0442  0.1 -1.2291 -1.4 -1.4075 -2.2 0.2079 0.6
% Catholic  -0.1777  -2.3 -0.0808 -0.5 -0.0137 -0.1 -0.1286 -1.4
Ln(Real family income)  -0.3210  -2.9 -0.0401 -0.1 -0.1146 -0.6 0.0108 0.1
% Female LFP  0.5748  2.1 1.0195 2.0 1.0059 2.2 -0.0761 -5.7
Avg precip  -0.0029  -3.4 -0.0033 -3.2 -0.0012 -1.0 -0.0050 -3.5
Heating degree days  0.0000  3.1 0.0000 1.4 0.0000 1.7 0.0000 2.4
Cooling degree days  0.0001  1.3 0.0000 0.1 0.0000 0.7 0.0000 2.7
Individual-Level Controls            
Years ed, female  -0.0789  -20.4 -0.0688 -14.3 -0.0618 -14.5 -0.0462 -29.1
Years ed, male  -0.0321  -16.1 -0.0321 -14.8 -0.0330 -18.0 -0.0138 -8.7
Female 15-20  -0.7805  -33.7 -0.6732 -20.8 -0.6310 -26.0 -0.5137 -13.3
Female 21-25  -0.4173  -40.7 -0.3313 -28.4 -0.2624 -23.9 -0.2812 -13.1
Female 31-35  0.4104  34.2 0.3461 33.6 0.3444 31.4 0.2293 18.5
Female 36-40  0.6748  35.5 0.4976 20.8 0.5090 34.3 0.3272 13.6
Male 15-20  -0.3346  -12.3 -0.3079 -7.3 -0.3042 -5.9 -0.4571 -5.8
Male 21-25  -0.1990  -12.6 -0.1815 -5.5 -0.1007 -5.6 -0.2287 -12.3
Male 31-35  0.2026  25.2 0.2440 19.0 0.2311 24.2 0.1874 15.8
Male 36-40  0.3680  40.5 0.3688 26.5 0.4429 32.4 0.2501 18.5
Male 40+  0.2373  9.8 0.1727 8.7 0.3193 16.3 0.1429 7.4
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Table 5, Continued. 
Black female  0.4207  18.8 0.2953 15.9 0.3022 16.9 0.2033 15.2
Hispanic female  0.2776  6.1 0.2493 5.6 0.2785 7.0 0.1442 8.7
Other female  0.0628  2.5 -0.0227 -1.2 0.0179 1.4 -0.0232 -1.5
Foreign born  -0.0955  -8.6 -0.0201 -0.8 -0.1012 -10.4 …  … 
Central city  -0.1296  -8.9 -0.1023 -7.5 -0.1403 -7.9 -0.3373 -26.9
Unknown CC  0.0448  1.6 -0.0029 -0.2 -0.0298 -1.6 …  … 
Female LF Participant  -0.5538  -30.1 -0.5578 -38.5 -0.4540 -29.1 0.5139 1.0
Mid Atlantic  -0.0365  -1.6 -0.0038 -0.1 -0.0061 -0.2 0.0007 0.5
East north central  -0.0133  -0.4 -0.0074 -0.2 -0.0073 -0.2 -0.0021 -0.7
West north central  -0.0551  -1.6 -0.0077 -0.2 0.0480 0.9 -0.0053 -1.4
South Atlantic  -0.1292  -3.7 -0.0491 -1.1 -0.0347 -0.8 -0.0030 -2.7
East south central  -0.1372  -3.3 0.0052 0.1 -0.0433 -0.9 0.0038 0.8
West south central  -0.0541  -0.8 0.0655 0.8 0.0043 0.1 -0.0070 -2.8
Mountain 0.0045  0.0 0.1240 0.6 0.0735 0.6 -0.0222 -2.8
Pacific 0.0770  2.1 0.0877 1.5 0.0578 1.2 0.0007 0.2
_cons 6.4044  5.3 3.2751 1.2 3.6054 2.0 0.96211 0.5
              
R-Square  0.3034   0.2145 0.1961 0.0715 
 Observations           108,729            103,512            105,762              76,094    
              
B. Price of Living Space Measured as CMSA RENT/FOOT         
CMSA RENT/FT
2 -1.2768  -3.7 -0.8073 -5.5 -0.1111 -0.9 -0.4282 -2.6
R-Square  0.3033   0.1961 0.1961 0.0715 
                                
 Note: Fertility regression on AHS households includes year dummy variables, which are not reported to save space.    
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Table 6. Age at First Marriage, IPUMS: Least Squares Regressions
1940 1970 1980
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
CMSA RENT/ROOM 0.0099 1.6 0.0148 3.4 0.0069 4.0
Other CMSA-Level Controls
% Female LFP 10.6955 2.4 1.3538 1.0 1.8486 4.0
% college grads 2.2256 4.2 1.5346 4.9 2.0869 11.3
% Catholic -0.1990 -0.3 -1.0644 -2.0 0.2058 0.8
Ln(Real family income) 2.5649 2.0 0.0471 0.1 0.3535 0.9
Avg precip 0.0031 0.6 -0.0120 -3.2 -0.0047 -2.1
Heating deg days 0.0001 1.6 -0.0001 -3.9 0.0000 0.0
Cooling deg days 0.0001 0.6 -0.0002 -3.2 -0.0001 -1.6
Individual-Level Controls
Years ed, female 0.1598 11.7 0.1256 5.9 0.3986 16.7
Years ed, male 0.0982 11.4 0.0291 2.7 0.0939 17.0
Black female -0.5316 -4.1 -0.0435 -0.7 0.5481 9.4
Hispanic female -0.3826 -1.8 -2.4867 -3.3 0.3939 2.7
Other female -0.3328 -0.5 1.0453 5.1 0.9173 14.7
0.5885 11.1 0.4460 2.6 1.1936 16.9
Central city 0.2205 4.5 (dropped) 0.2945 11.0
Unknown CC 0.1115 1.0 (dropped) -0.0396 -0.9
Female LF Participant 0.6005 9.0 0.1224 2.4 0.1472 6.0
Mid Atlantic -0.1950 -1.2 0.2355 2.2 0.2880 4.4
East north central -0.5723 -3.3 -0.0315 -0.3 -0.1053 -1.5
West north central -0.5292 -2.6 -0.0699 -0.5 -0.1829 -2.0
South Atlantic -0.4337 -2.3 0.0251 0.2 0.1953 2.6
East south central -0.7100 -2.8 0.0497 0.4 -0.0409 -0.4
West south central -0.9947 -4.1 -0.0897 -0.6 -0.3637 -4.0
Mountain -1.2440 -4.0 -0.3253 -1.8 -0.2863 -2.6
Pacific -0.7013 -2.4 -0.4575 -3.0 -0.1831 -1.5
Intercept 18.1414 3.0 19.4132 3.5 10.5496 4.0
R-Square 0.0856 0.0056 0.1527
Observations 24,655  253,130 172,944 
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Table 7. Age at First Birth, IPUMS: Least Squares Regressions
1940 1950 1970 1980 1990 2000
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
CMSA RENT/ROOM 0.0182 2.4 0.0227 2.6 0.0107 3.5 0.0097 2.7 0.0047 1.9 0.0037 2.9
Other CMSA-Level Controls
% college grads -0.5832 -0.1 4.1211 1.3 0.6595 0.7 1.6432 2.5 3.0944 3.8 2.8159 3.5
% Catholic 2.4221 3.6 1.6592 3.4 1.4714 7.6 1.8732 9.4 1.7976 7.4 1.4237 6.0
Ln(Real family income) -0.5122 -0.7 0.4776 0.8 -0.2213 -0.8 -0.4412 -1.3 1.3675 3.1 1.0904 2.9
% Female LFP 6.1413 3.4 0.1052 1.7 1.8612 3.2 2.7959 4.9 -1.4498 -1.8 0.1588 0.2
Avg precip 0.0059 0.9 0.0146 4.4 0.0038 1.5 -0.0009 -0.5 0.0039 1.5 -0.0036 -1.4
Heating deg days 0.0000 -0.6 0.0001 2.0 0.0000 -2.0 -0.0001 -2.4 0.0000 1.1 0.0000 0.2
Cooling deg days -0.0003 -1.6 0.0002 1.5 -0.0001 -2.6 -0.0002 -3.7 0.0001 0.9 0.0001 1.7
Individual-Level Controls
Years ed, female 0.2379 10.3 0.3042 12.1 0.4180 17.3 0.5211 16.9 0.4961 11.0 0.4422 14.1
Years ed, male 0.1512 12.1 (dropped) 0.1168 24.4 0.1944 17.3 0.2413 15.5 0.2432 12.5
Black female -1.1968 -5.1 -1.5914 -9.1 -0.8960 -18.0 -1.3653 -24.3 -1.6955 -17.6 -1.7853 -25.4
Hispanic female -0.3903 -1.7 -0.5374 -2.2 0.4890 4.3 0.1154 0.8 -0.5831 -4.2 -0.7672 -4.2
Other female -1.4598 -2.3 0.8554 2.3 1.0850 12.5 0.3444 5.4 0.2013 2.4 -0.3826 -8.2
Foreign  born 0.6221 8.7 0.7539 7.5 0.9283 11.8 1.1203 9.8 0.7764 6.4 0.8364 7.0
Central city 0.1380 1.5 0.3544 6.7 (dropped) 0.0358 1.0 0.0122 0.2 -0.2921 -2.5
Unknown CC -0.1323 -0.9 0.0872 0.8 (dropped) -0.1349 -2.9 -0.0849 -1.7 -0.1923 -3.1
Female LF Participant -0.4101 -3.4 -0.7758 -10.9 -0.4159 -24.4 -0.3515 -15.8 -0.0968 -2.8 -0.2229 -5.4
Mid Atlantic 0.1043 0.5 -0.0650 -0.3 0.3151 4.8 0.2820 3.1 0.2738 3.3 0.0145 0.1
East north central 0.0747 0.3 -0.5704 -2.2 -0.0780 -1.0 0.0358 0.4 0.0201 0.2 -0.4184 -4.2
West north central 0.1432 0.6 -0.4806 -1.8 -0.1728 -1.7 0.0222 0.2 0.0932 0.6 -0.6572 -5.5
South Atlantic 0.1219 0.4 -0.5538 -2.1 0.0240 0.3 0.3039 3.3 0.3313 2.6 -0.2994 -2.3
East south central -0.5886 -1.7 -0.6854 -2.4 0.0020 0.0 0.1615 1.4 0.2199 1.7 -0.3764 -2.6
West south central 0.1980 0.7 -1.2313 -4.8 -0.2441 -2.4 -0.0835 -0.7 -0.0005 0.0 -0.6778 -5.1
Mountain 0.5160 1.4 -0.8691 -2.2 -0.3420 -2.6 -0.2815 -2.1 -0.0969 -0.6 -1.0280 -6.7
Pacific -0.1706 -0.5 -0.2798 -1.0 -0.4751 -3.9 -0.3428 -2.8 0.1399 1.1 -0.5661 -3.8
Intercept 21.4455 2.9 12.3316 2.1 16.0177 5.2 15.7697 4.6 -2.1686 -0.5 1.8445 0.5
R-Square 0.1245 0.1133 0.1813 0.2259 0.2082 0.2100
Observations 9,804     18,776  149,890 96,487  85,486  78,215   
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Table 8.  OLS Regressions for Children Ever Born, Older Households (Wives Age 41 and Over)                   
  1940 1950 1960 1970    1980    1990 
                       
 Coef. z  Coef. z  Coef. z  Coef. z    Coef. z    Coef. z  
CMSA RENT/ROOM  -0.0121 -3.2 -0.0075 -1.4 -0.0202 -5.5 -0.0107 -7.9 -0.0060 -5.2 -0.0015 -1.3
Other CMSA-Level Controls                       
% Coll grad  2.6632 0.9 -2.8073 -1.3 2.3349 0.8 1.6267 2.2  0.9490 2.1  0.5509 1.2
% Catholic  -0.1013 -0.3 -0.0043 0.0 0.2778 1.2 -0.0422 -0.3 0.1882 1.4 0.3069 2.3
Ln(Real Fam Inc)  -1.5652 -3.3 -1.2935 -3.6 -0.5395 -1.5 -0.1372 -0.6 -0.3916 -2.2 -0.6186 -3.4
%Female LFP  -1.1494 -0.7 -0.0113 -0.3 1.1142 1.2 -0.1155 -0.3 -0.2141 -0.5  0.9280 1.8
Avg precip  -0.0019 -0.5 -0.0097 -3.0 -0.0048 -2.3 -0.0025 -2.0 -0.0026 -1.8 -0.0023 -1.4
Heating  deg  days  0.0000 1.0 0.0001 2.3 0.0000 0.5 0.0001 4.7 0.0001 6.5 0.0001 2.7
Cooling deg day  -0.0001 -1.3 0.0000 -0.4 -0.0001 -1.5 0.0001 2.2  0.0001 3.1  0.0001 1.5
Individual-Level Controls                       
Years ed, female  -0.1047 -13.6 -0.1094 -16.8 -0.0701 -21.3 -0.0574 -20.5 -0.0667 -19.5 -0.0804 -19.3
Years ed, male  -0.0527 -6.6 …  …  -0.0455 -16.0 -0.0351 -12.5 -0.0320 -12.7 -0.0328 -9.6
Female  46-50  -0.0454 -0.8 0.1240 3.7 -0.2539 -17.6 -0.2467 -17.5 0.0922 5.9 0.3211 23.2
Female 51-55  -0.0913 -1.4 0.1483 3.1 -0.3149 -16.1 -0.4926 -31.4 -0.0514 -2.2  0.6671 27.1
Female 56-60  -0.0616 -0.8 0.2672 6.3 -0.2829 -10.5 -0.7059 -37.6 -0.3115 -12.9  0.8012 27.8
Female 61-65  -0.1921 -1.9 0.3758 7.1 -0.2116 -6.9 -0.8120 -31.7 -0.5882 -18.0  0.6498 20.8
Female 66-70  -0.0769 -0.6 0.5250 5.9 -0.1952 -6.8 -0.8168 -31.1 -0.7975 -22.7  0.4616 11.5
Female 71+  0.3171 2.0 0.5244 5.8 -0.0750 -1.7 -0.6395 -18.9  -0.8649 -23.1  0.0304 0.8
Male < 41  -0.2388 -1.9 …  …  -0.2148 -5.6 -0.1962 -7.4 -0.2111 -5.4 -0.1656 -6.9
Male 46-50  0.1570 2.6 …  …  0.0125 0.7 -0.0615 -3.2  0.0906 5.0  -0.0092 -0.6
Male 51-55  0.3114 4.4 …  …  -0.0729 -3.4 -0.1565 -7.7 0.0760 3.2  -0.0037 -0.2
Male 56-60  0.3326 3.8 …  …  -0.1480 -5.2 -0.2349 -8.9 -0.0249 -1.0 -0.0344 -1.4
Male 61-65  0.4097 4.4 …  …  -0.1742 -6.4 -0.2872 -12.1 -0.0896 -2.9 -0.0765 -2.6
Male 66-70  0.5235 4.4 …  …  -0.0655 -2.2 -0.3557 -11.9 -0.1360 -3.7 -0.1406 -5.3
Male 71+  0.5549 4.8 …  …  0.0564 1.1 -0.2695 -7.7 -0.1658 -4.1 -0.2455 -6.8
Black female  -0.0791 -0.6 -0.1584 -2.2 -0.0573 -1.0 0.1892 3.6 0.4401 8.0 0.4181 11.7
Hispanic  female  0.9278 2.4 0.8774 3.5 1.0328 5.4 0.7615 5.1 0.8378 5.9 0.6834 7.2
Other  female  1.5359 3.4 1.3437 3.2 0.6848 3.5 0.4654 8.9 0.4851 7.2 0.4717 14.9
Central City  0.4397 7.4 0.2386 5.4 0.0061 0.2 -0.0907 -8.3 -0.2211 -8.2 -0.1718 -7.5 
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Table 8,  continued. 
Unknown CC  -0.3511 -5.6 -0.3219 -6.8 -0.2660 -9.7 …  …   -0.1778 -8.3 -0.1485 -4.2
Foreign Born  -0.0487 -0.6 -0.0732 -1.0 -0.0623 -0.9 … …   0.0057 0.2  -0.0231 -1.0
Female LF Participant  -0.7065 -10.1 -0.4242 -10.5 -0.3775 -14.8 -0.2809 -21.5 -0.1157 -10.0 -0.1097 -9.2
Mid Atlantic  0.0841 0.9 -0.0638 -0.8 -0.0601 -1.0 -0.2103 -4.3 -0.1545 -3.5 -0.1098 -2.1
East north central  0.0987 0.9 -0.0669 -0.7 0.1593 1.4 -0.0624 -1.1 0.0343 0.6  -0.0210 -0.4
West north central  -0.0441 -0.3 -0.1884 -1.9 0.0657 0.9 -0.1166 -1.5 0.0374 0.7  -0.0553 -0.9
South Atlantic  0.2191 1.3 0.1478 1.3 0.0712 0.7 -0.0955 -1.6 -0.0117 -0.2 -0.1002 -1.8
East south central  -0.0633 -0.4 0.1122 0.8 0.1639 1.2 0.0206 0.3  0.0613 0.8  -0.0780 -1.2
West south central  0.4541 2.8 0.2787 2.3 0.1387 1.6 -0.0219 -0.3  0.1684 2.5  -0.0276 -0.4
Mountain  0.1511 0.9 0.3268 1.0 … …  0.0223 0.1 0.1719 1.4 0.0135 0.1
Pacific -0.1119 -0.7 -0.0524 -0.3 -0.0471 -0.5 0.0779 1.0 0.3006 4.2 0.1552 2.0
Constant  21.0393 4.2 16.8331 4.6 9.9527 2.7 5.8118 2.4 8.2180 4.4 9.6854 5.6
                         
R-Square  0.1044 0.0808 0.0679 0.0638    0.0778    0.0904 
                         
Observations      20,053         27,328       113,489       276,010         182,041        198,503   
Clusters  117  127  32  103   218   224 
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Table 9. OLS Regressions for Children in Household by Mobility Group 
             
Estimated Coefficients on CMSA RENT/ROOM    
  Coef  
Robust 
Standard Error t  Obs 
Percent of 
total 
A. Short Stayers           
1940 -0.0059 0.0035  -1.7 7,438 0.30
1950 -0.0113 0.0033  -3.5 12,066 0.35
1960 -0.0164 0.0027  -6.0 30,663 0.26
1970 -0.0078 0.0019  -4.1 28,734 0.23
1980 -0.0049 0.0011  -4.7 23,078 0.27
1990 -0.0016 0.0009  -1.8 48,289 0.29
2000 -0.0015 0.0004  -3.5 54,707 0.33
             
B. Long Stayers           
1940 0.0017 0.0025  0.7 12,742 0.52
1950 -0.0057 0.0029  -2.0 19,540 0.57
1960 -0.0047 0.0037  -1.3 55,885 0.47
1970 -0.0140 0.0017  -8.0 48,611 0.38
1980 -0.0039 0.0011  -3.6 39,616 0.46
1990 -0.0017 0.0008  -2.0 74,195 0.44
2000 0.0002 0.0004  0.5 67,112 0.40
             
C. Movers             
1940 0.0039 0.0035  1.1 4,475 0.18
1950 0.0074 0.0055  1.4 2,938 0.09
1960 -0.0005 0.0030  -0.2 31,624 0.27
1970 -0.0084 0.0013  -6.6 49,395 0.39
1980 -0.0025 0.0011  -2.5 23,537 0.27
1990 -0.0028 0.0007  -4.0 44,370 0.27
2000 -0.0015 0.0003  -4.7 44,342 0.27









Table 13. Deviation of Own Rent per Room from CMSA Mean Rent Per Room  
 1980    1990    2000 
 (i)    (ii)    (i)    (ii)    (i)    (ii) 
                              
# Children  -3.69 -7.7  -3.69 -7.7 -5.62 -7.4  -5.6 -7.4 -7.53 -6.8  -7.40 -6.7
Individual-Level Controls  Coef. t   Coef. t     Coef. t    Coef. t     Coef. t  Coef. t  
Years  ed,  female  0.59 3.8  0.60 4.0 0.23 0.5 0.26 0.6 2.85 7.6 2.87 8.1
Years  ed,  male  1.03 9.2  1.04 9.5 1.05 3.8 1.08 4.1 3.76 10.9 3.78 11.2
Female  15-20  6.99 5.9  7.01 5.9 7.46 4.0 7.46 4.0 2.92 0.8 3.15 0.9
Female  21-25  2.59 4.8  2.62 4.8 4.74 3.8 4.82 3.9 0.49 0.3 0.64 0.4
Female  31-35  0.34 0.7  0.34 0.7 -0.45 -1.0 -0.48 -1.1  1.54 1.7  1.51 1.7
Female  36-40  0.73 1.1  0.72 1.1 -0.26 -0.4 -0.34 -0.6  3.69 3.8  3.66 3.8
Male  15-20  4.09 3.7  4.10 3.7 5.98 1.9 6.12 1.9  -2.35 -0.7  -1.82 -0.5
Male  21-25  2.24 4.3  2.29 4.3 3.80 5.1 3.88 5.2  -2.06 -1.2  -1.75 -1.0
Male  31-35  0.89 2.2  0.88 2.1 -2.06 -4.5 -2.09 -4.6  3.67 3.8  3.51 3.7
Male  36-40  2.44 5.1  2.43 5.0 -1.61 -2.4 -1.64 -2.4  6.20 8.5  6.11 8.3
Male  40+  2.14 2.4  2.15 2.4 -2.42 -2.2 -2.44 -2.2  6.69 5.8  6.58 5.6
Black  female  -4.91 -5.8  -4.87 -5.7 -1.82 -1.5 -1.96 -1.6  -20.72 -5.1  -20.91 -5.1
Hispanic  female  0.42 0.4  0.61 0.5 8.86 3.9 9.03 3.9  -8.47 -3.6  -7.86 -3.5
Other  female  9.17 4.8  9.08 4.9 16.36 7.2 15.88 7.3  5.52 2.8  5.34 2.8
Foreign  born  10.18 7.9  9.93 7.9 21.44 6.3 20.27 6.5 27.85 11.2 26.12 11.5
Central  city  1.08 0.6  1.10 0.6 10.15 2.2 10.34 2.2 12.17 1.9 12.67 1.9
Unknown  CC  -1.46 -1.7  -1.45 -1.6 1.61 1.2 1.50 1.1 3.41 1.4 3.27 1.4
Female LF Participant  0.32 1.0  0.28 0.9  -2.72 -4.7  -2.83 -5.1  -11.78 -11.2  -11.84 -11.1
Mid  Atlantic  3.76 3.6  2.84 2.6 7.92 5.4 6.14 4.2  -19.15 -2.8  -19.69 -2.9
East north central  3.33 3.0  2.38 1.9  3.10 1.7  0.74 0.4  -1.50 -0.3  -2.74 -0.5
West  north  central  4.03 1.7  3.07 1.3 7.32 3.3 4.67 2.2 0.69 0.1  -0.23 0.0
South  Atlantic  1.97 1.5 0.71 0.5  0.45 0.2  -2.12 -0.8 -12.79 -2.1 -13.52 -2.2
East south central  6.67 4.3  5.36 3.2  10.81 4.0  7.64 2.8  -0.14 0.0  -1.03 -0.2
West south central  2.60 1.7  1.64 0.9  4.54 1.3  2.18 0.6  -9.95 -1.4  -10.30 -1.5
Mountain  2.49 1.2  1.15 0.5 8.29 2.0 5.70 1.5  -4.14 -0.5  -6.16 -0.7
Pacific  4.77 1.8 3.47 1.3  1.80 0.5  -0.73 -0.2 -14.68 -1.6 -15.83 -1.8 
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Table 12, continued.  
CMSA-Level Controls                              
%  college  grads  2.18 0.2 4.05 0.3 -48.82 -2.6 -41.29 -2.2 -88.51 -3.8 -82.57 -3.6
%  Catholic  13.63 4.3  12.10 3.6 11.35 2.4  9.00 2.0 11.87 1.3 10.20 1.1
ln(Real family income)  11.36 2.6  10.78 2.4 19.77 2.0 16.29 1.7 47.52 3.1 48.64 3.0
% Female LFP  14.59 1.3  12.64 1.1  10.16 0.5  11.11 0.6  -167.72 -5.3  -172.98 -5.3
Avg  precip  -0.15 -3.3  -0.15 -3.3 -0.03 -0.5 -0.03 -0.5 -0.04 -0.3 -0.07 -0.5
Heating degree days  0.00 -4.6  0.00 -4.6  0.00 -3.7  0.00 -3.4  -0.01 -4.6  -0.01 -4.5
Cooling  degree  days  0.00 -5.0  -0.01 -4.9 -0.01 -7.2 -0.01 -6.8 -0.02 -7.6 -0.02 -7.5
Mobility x Rent Controls                              
Long  stayer  -7.52 -13.4 9.42 3.2 -14.57 -12.2  16.17 5.0 -16.11 -7.6  37.05 5.5
Short  stayer  -7.02 -10.8 6.25 1.8 -13.09 -11.2  -1.99 -0.3 -12.65 -6.4  14.74 1.6
CMSA  RENT/ROOM  -0.35 -8.7  -0.21 -3.8 0.00 0.0 0.16 2.3  -0.04 -0.7 0.14 1.7
    x Long stayer        -0.21 -5.6       -0.28 -7.7       -0.32 -7.2
    x Short stayer        -0.16 -3.6       -0.10 -1.6       -0.16 -2.6
  -93.54 -2.3  -97.13 -2.3 -177.61 -1.9 -159.42 -1.8 -381.62 -2.4 -421.52 -2.5
I n t e r c e p t                               
                              
R-Square  0.1036    0.1048  0.3409   0.3431  0.2726    0.275 
Observations  74,066    74,066   160,099   168,976   158,849   158,849 
CMSAs  218    218   224   224   237   237 
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Table 14. Endogeneity Diagnostics and Instrumental Variables Estimates                     
  OLS   all  insts  birth ONLY    NO birth 
           prob values   prob values      prob values
year coeff 
robust 
t-stat    coeff 
robust 
t-stat DWH J  coeff 
robust 
t-stat DWH J    coeff 
robust 
t-stat DWH J 
1940 -0.0004  -0.2    0.0048  1.0 0.168 0.092 0.0003 0.0 0.768 0.026  0.0017  0.4 0.267 0.096
1950 -0.0067  -4.0    -0.0071  -2.1 0.973 0.092 -0.0055 -1.0 0.767 0.070  -0.0063  -2.1 0.879 0.013
1960 -0.0076  -2.6    -0.0024  -0.8 0.007 0.002 -0.0019 -0.4 0.046 0.001  -0.0015  -0.5 0.022 0.443
1970 -0.0101  -9.0    -0.0059  -2.3 0.042 0.016 -0.0043 -0.9 0.097 0.000  -0.0072  -3.0 0.134 0.158
1980 -0.0039  -5.5    -0.0031  -2.7 0.906 0.043 -0.0006 -0.3 0.122 0.000  -0.0041  -3.7 0.816 0.399
1990 -0.0019  -3.2    -0.0022  -1.8 0.986 0.027 -0.0006 -0.3 0.384 0.014  -0.0017  -1.5 0.402 0.500
2000 -0.0011  -2.8    -0.0007  -1.1 0.778 0.071 0.0023 2.2 0.002 0.000  -0.0008  -1.2 0.595 0.041
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Figure 2. Mean Children in Household and CMSA RENT/ROOM:


































Figure 3. Children in Household and CMSA RENT/ROOM
Partial Regression Plot 
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